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EXAMINING MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS PACKAGES AND ORGANISATIONAL 
AMBIDEXTERITY - Case Tekla Oyj 
 
Research objectives 
 
The study endeavours both to examine management control systems packages operating within two 
business units of the case company and to compare and contrast how these control packages and their 
functionality stand vis-à-vis each other. Moreover, this thesis aims at assessing the performance 
implications of the management control system packages by examining whether control packages of 
certain kind, if any, enable a firm to achieve ambidextrous strategy, i.e. simultaneous effective 
execution of explorative and exploitative capabilities. 
 
Sources and research method 
 
The study draws on a wide array of theoretical references encompassing journal articles and books 
addressing management control systems, their operation as a package as well as organisational 
ambidexterity. The empirical evidence, in turn, was collected from a range of sources. These 
included eight interviews, a number of internal company documents, several business press reports 
and annual company reports. The various sources of evidence were used to provide multiple 
measures of the same issue (triangulation), rather than simply being used as mixed methods of data 
collection. 
 
A case-based approach was employed in this study. The comparative case study was conducted by 
interviewing eight (8) representatives at both senior and middle management level. All interviews 
were  recorded  and  transcribed.  Once  the  analysis  was  completed,  findings  were  fed  back  to  the  
interviewees for review in order to ascertain the veracity of the researcher’s understanding of various 
issues.   
 
Results  
 
Several findings emerge from the study. First, the control packages of the business units were found 
to be virtually akin to each other but, however, equally functional in the face of different 
contingencies. Second, the packages seemed to rely more on informal and “organic” controls as 
opposed to formal and “mechanistic” controls. Third, whilst cultural controls were argued to provide 
a contextual frame for other controls, reward and compensation controls were asserted to remain 
relatively separate from other package elements. Planning, cybernetic, and administrative controls, 
on the other hand, appeared to be tightly linked in practice. Finally, the business units’ management 
control systems packages were argued to be of assistance in fostering organisational ambidexterity.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This empirical case study examines the management control systems package (henceforth MCSP) 
and its performance implications at the strategic business unit (SBU) level in a Finnish listed 
company – Tekla Oyj. Drawing on the typology presented by Malmi & Brown (2008), the study 
endeavours both to improve our understanding of what kind of MCSP configurations exist at the 
SBU level and to compare and contrast how these control packages and their functionality stand vis-
à-vis each other. Moreover, this thesis aims to assess the performance implications of these MCSPs 
by examining whether control packages of certain kind, if any, enable a firm to achieve 
ambidextrous strategy. That is to say, in this thesis performance is conceptualised as a firm’s ability 
to jointly pursue both exploitative and explorative orientation, i.e. having a capability of being 
ambidextrous.  
 
Specifically, the first objective of the study will be addressed by examining the various forms that 
MCSPs take in SBUs of the case company. However, of important note is that this study also pays 
particular attention to the possible interplay between various control elements and techniques within 
the package. The typology proposed by Malmi & Brown (2008) allows us to divide controls and 
control systems into five categories: planning, cybernetic, reward and compensation, administrative, 
and cultural controls (see Appendix A). When these elements of control are regarded as operating 
together in order to achieve organisational purposes, they are seen as a “package” of controls 
(Bedford, 2006). Secondly, the study seeks to shed more light on the perceived functionality of 
MCSPs. This functionality is based on the ideas of Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) and in this thesis it 
refers to the capacity of a control package to simultaneously demonstrate alignment and adaptability 
across an entire business unit. Finally, the study aims to find out whether a company’s ability to 
concurrently be successful at both exploiting the present and exploring the future could be partly 
attributable to its MCSP. 
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1.2 MOTIVATION 
 
The notion of management control systems (henceforth MCS) operating as a package is not new 
(Otley, 1980). Whilst the idea as such has existed for almost thirty years, the existing body of 
literature has attempted to study the MCS from a holistic point of view only to a scant extent 
(Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Alvesson & Kärreman, 2004; Bedford, 2006). However, it is well-
recognised that instead of focusing on a single MCS element or practice (such as Balanced Scorecard 
or budget) alone a broader package approach should be taken when studying and considering 
management control systems (Fisher, 1998; Flamholtz, 1983; Otley, 1999; Bedford, 2006; Malmi & 
Brown, 2008). According to Malmi & Brown (2008), studying MCS in tandem would facilitate 
better theorising and thus more reliable conclusions about individual MCS practises and the 
designing of MCS packages. This insight is supported by Otley (1999), who argues that meaningful 
connections between the use of control systems and overall results emerge only when the overall 
system is considered. 
 
Otley (1999) argues that in respect of MCS studies the current literature has focused excessively on 
examining only financial performance implications of MCS. Moreover, he believes that the 
economic perspective alone is not adequate in providing “a sufficiently rich picture of the internal 
activities of organisations to provide reliable guidance to the designers of management control 
systems” (p. 363). Ten years later an increasing body of literature has also addressed other 
performance implications (such as learning and behavioural implications) but the financial 
perspective continues to dominate. This study goes beyond financial performance implications by 
paying specific attention to organisational ambidexterity as a measure for performance.     
 
Today’s contemporary organisations are in the face of a rapidly changing environment. Hence, it is 
increasingly acknowledged that in order to be successful in the long-term, a company is required not 
only to achieve alignment in its current operations but also to adapt effectively to the changing 
environmental demands (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). In other words, 
future’s successful organisations are ambidextrous (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). This emerges a 
relevant question: what does it require to become or to maintain the capability of being 
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ambidextrous? According to Jansen et al (2008b), the effort that academics have exerted to answer 
the question is still in its infancy. Since the prevailing literature explicitly fails to consider the 
functionality of MCSPs as a possible antecedent of a firm’s ability to simultaneously explore and 
exploit, researching the relationship between MCSPs and organisational ambidexterity will 
substantiate and complement our understanding of the existing antecedents. 
 
While the study appears to be justified from the theory’s viewpoint, it is arguably evident that the 
matters addressed in this study are also of pragmatic relevance. What kind of control package 
designs, if any, could potentially have a favourable impact on a company’s ability to be successful in 
the short-term as well as in the long-run is a question that can easily be regarded as a major issue to 
be solved in contemporary organisations. Furthermore, Otley (2001) argues that “the interest 
amongst real organisations in understanding and developing their systems of performance 
management has never been greater”. 
 
1.3 CONTRIBUTION 
 
By analysing eight interviews conducted in two SBUs of a midsize Finnish listed company this thesis 
contributes to a larger MCSP research project conducted in Finland and endeavours, both as a part of 
the larger project and alone, to address the abovementioned gaps in the literature. Consequently, the 
present case study contributes to the current literature in three ways. First, by examining the forms 
that MCSP take in practice the study contributes to the scarce, but increasingly demanded, academic 
discussion on MCSP configurations. The thin stream of literature that has examined the issue 
comprises for example Abernethy & Chua (1996), Alvesson & Kärreman (2004), Bedford (2006) 
and Sandelin (2008). According to Bedford (2006) the first two case studies were conducted in rather 
unique organisational environments (a public teaching hospital and a management consultancy firm, 
respectively) and, also, take an institutional perspective. Sandelin’s (2008) case study on the other 
hand focused on control system variety in a growth firm context.  
 
Secondly, this thesis seeks to add to the extant body of organisational ambidexterity literature. 
Specifically, the study endeavours to contribute to the academic discussion on how organisations 
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actually balance and synchronise exploitative and explorative activities. While there are a number of 
studies addressing organisational ambidexterity’s antecedents, the current literature on the issue 
contains several shortcomings and thus fails to substantiate our understanding of the antecedents 
(Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). In addition, the proposed antecedents hardly represent an exhaustive 
list of things that enable a firm to address exploitation and exploration simultaneously. Therefore, 
this study contributes to the literature also by potentially complementing and/or confirming that list. 
 
Finally, by analysing the functionality and configurations of MCSPs this study provides a reflection 
on the contingency theory. That is, on the one hand, the comparison of the MCSP configurations of 
two considerably distinct business units sheds further light on the extent to which MCSPs evolve in 
response to firm specific contingencies as opposed to business unit specific contingencies and, on the 
other hand, the comparison of the functionality of these packages enables a reflection on the fit or 
alignment between the contingent variables and the MCSPs. 
 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief overview what 
is meant by management control systems and their operation as a package in this study, including the 
presentation of the best-known package frameworks in the management accounting literature. The 
following section addresses the performance concept, which in this study refers to organisational 
ambidexterity, and, specifically, takes a closer look at the existing literature on the antecedents of 
ambidexterity. The fourth section aims to synthesise the theoretical concepts of MCSP and 
organisational ambidexterity presented in the previous sections.  
 
The used research method, data collection as well as measurement and validation of constructs are 
presented in the fifth section. The sixth section will outline the results of the comparative case study. 
The seventh section discusses the empirical findings and, finally, the last section draws the 
concluding remarks and limitations of the study, and proposes a number of avenues for future 
research.  
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2. MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS 
 
This section defines what is meant by management control systems and their operation as a package 
in this thesis. Once the appropriate definitions have been addressed the section turns to present the 
most relevant package conceptualisations in the management accounting literature. At the end of the 
section both limitations and advantages of each presented framework will be discussed. 
 
2.1 DEFINITION OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS 
 
What constitutes an MCS is a question that has been answered in various ways in the existing 
management accounting literature (Fisher, 1998; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Merchant & Otley, 2007). 
Due to the absence of a general and well articulated definition, the interpretation of research results 
and design of MCS is somewhat problematic (Fisher, 1998; Malmi & Brown, 2008). This view is 
supported by Bisbe et al (2007) who argue that it is important to pay particular attention to the 
conceptual specification of the studied construct since a careful definition will foster both more 
effective research into MCS and progress in understanding the results. 
 
The earliest definition of MCS was provided by Anthony (1965), according to whom management 
control is “the process by which managers ensure that resources are obtained and used effectively 
and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organisation’s objectives”. Anthony’s (1965) definition 
is of slightly narrow nature since it separates management control from strategic control and 
operational control. Flamholz (1983), on the other hand, emphasises the behavioural aspect of MCS 
by arguing that individuals and organisations share only partially congruent objectives why it is 
necessary to channel human efforts toward a specified set of institutional goals, which inevitably 
leads to a need for control. The behavioural viewpoint is also supported by Merchant & Van der 
Stede (2003, p. 7) who argue that “...management control involves managers taking steps to ensure 
that the employees do what is best for the organisation. This is an important function because it is 
people in the organisation who make things happen…If all employees could always be relied on to 
do what is best for the organisation there would be no need for MCS”. In addition, MCS have been 
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conceptualised as formal, information-based routines and procedures managers use to maintain or 
alter patterns of organisational activities (Simons, 2000, p. 4).  
 
As the definitions above indicate, some conceptualisations are broader than others. In respect of the 
broadest definitions where, for instance, strategy implementation and learning processes fall inside 
the scope, Merchant & Otley (2007, p. 785) state that “almost everything in the organisation is 
included as part of the overall control system”. This study, however, applies the definition provided 
by Malmi & Brown (2008), which draws a distinction between management control systems and 
decision support systems. Hence, systems solely designated to support decision-making of senior 
executives and managers are left out. The rationale behind this separation lies in the monitoring and 
guiding of subordinates as Malmi & Brown (2008, p. 290) articulate: “unless the support system is 
used by an individual (manager) to guide another’s (subordinate) behaviour then it is a decision 
support system, regardless of whether it is used by senior managers or provided by senior managers 
for their subordinate managers”. In aggregate, Malmi & Brown (2008, p. 290) define MCS as 
follows: 
 
Management controls include all the devices and systems managers use to ensure that 
the behaviours and decisions of their employees are consistent with the organization’s 
objectives and strategies, but exclude pure decision-support systems. Any system, such as 
budgeting or a strategy scorecard can be categorised as a management control system. 
 
As Malmi & Brown (2008) point out, the definition is broader than definitions provided by Anthony 
(1965) and Simons (2000), since strategic and operational controls targeted at directing employees 
and other than information-based routines fall inside the scope, respectively. However, the definition 
is narrower than the ones that take decision support systems into consideration. 
 
The above definition proposed by Malmi & Brown (2008) is, however, not exhaustive. Specifically, 
it can be queried what distinguishes a management control from a management control system? The 
authors argue that systems, rules, values and other activities that management puts in place in order 
to direct employee behaviour should be called management controls. Moreover, if these are complete 
systems, then they should be called management control systems (Malmi & Brown, 2008). What 
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constitutes a complete system then? If a complete system requires elements such as input, process, 
output and, most importantly, feedback, what would this mean in the context of management control 
systems? For instance, would an organisation’s culture be considered as an MCS only if there is a 
feedback element in place that enables managers to monitor and take actions based on the feedback 
information?  
 
Despite these open-ended questions it is thought here that the distinction between management 
controls and management control systems is rather theoretical - not empirical. Therefore, this study 
follows Malmi & Brown (2008) in defining management controls as an upper concept that includes 
devices and systems that managers use to ensure that the behaviours and decisions of their 
employees are consistent with the organisation’s objectives and strategies. Hence, it is not of highest 
importance to debate whether a specific means of controlling subordinates’ behaviours and decisions 
is called a device, practice, mechanism or a system as long as it can be identified as an independent 
means of management control and it eventually serves the purpose inherent to management control - 
attainment of organisation’s desired objectives. 
 
According to Merchant & Van der Stede (2003; p. 14), managers implement different control 
mechanisms, or management controls, and the collection of these control mechanisms used is 
generally referred to as a management control system. Malmi & Brown (2008), on the other hand, 
argue that organisations have numerous MCS and the whole system could be called a management 
control system only if these systems were designed and coordinated intentionally. As different 
systems are often introduced by different interest groups at different times, they argue, the controls 
should not be regarded as a single system. Instead, the collection of these different controls and 
control systems should be defined as a package of systems (Malmi & Brown, 2008). This is exactly 
the issue to be addressed in the next section.  
 
2.2 MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS PACKAGE 
 
As it is mentioned above, the holistic perspective on management control systems is not new (Otley, 
1980). The academics have acknowledged to an increasing extent that MCS should be considered as 
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operating together in order to better understand the design and use of MCS (Fisher, 1998: Langfield-
Smith, 2007; Otley, 1999; Malmi & Brown, 2008). Bedford (2006) emphasises that the different 
MCS elements constitute a package if they operate together in order to achieve organisational 
outcomes. Following this line of argument, Fisher (1998) and Flamholz (1983) state that if the 
linkages between the control system elements (such as budgeting and organisation’s culture) are not 
adequate, then the system (here MCSP) may not fulfil its intended functions. That is, the MCSP may 
fail to influence behaviour in its intended ways.  
 
The underlying rationale of the MCS package phenomenon can be crystallised as Malmi & Brown 
(2008, p. 287) put it: “MCS do not operate in isolation.” Indeed, it is logical to think that a firm 
employs various MCS that may have reciprocal linkages (Abernethy & Brownell, 1997) and, thus, 
the operation of a single system is quite likely affected by its closest contingency factors, i.e. other 
MCS. It is worth reminding that this thesis pays particular attention to the interplay between these 
control elements. Hence, this study acknowledges the fact that a company employs a combination of 
interrelated MCS and that they to some extent serve the same purpose of aligning individual’s 
activities with organisation’s desired objectives (Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Alvesson & Kärreman, 
2004). Consequently, this thesis draws on the idea that this combination can be conceptualised as a 
“package” of controls and follows Malmi & Brown (2008, p. 287) in defining MCSP as follows: 
 
As a general conception, a management control systems (MCS) package is a collection 
or set of controls and control systems. The individual control systems may be more 
traditional accounting controls such as budgets and financial measures, or 
administrative controls, for example organisation structure and governance systems, 
along with more socially based controls such as values and culture. 
 
Previous literature provides numerous conceptual frames for studying MCS as a package (Sandelin, 
2008). Consequently, different opinions exist whether a certain conceptualisation provides a better 
framework for studying MCSP than another. The following sections provide brief introductions to 
the three well-known frameworks proposed by Merchant & Van der Stede (2003), Simons (2000) 
and Malmi & Brown (2008). In respect of the three frameworks, each control element and its key 
systems will be outlined. Also, since this study primarily builds upon Malmi & Brown’s (2008) 
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typology, the limitations and problems of the abandoned frameworks as well as the advantages of the 
selected one are discussed. 
 
2.2.1 Object-Of-Control Framework 
 
Merchant & Van der Stede (2003) argue that the need for management control exists due to three 
main causes: lack of direction, motivational problems, and personal limitations. To address these 
issues, they propose the object of control framework, which divides control practices into four 
groups. Literally, the classification stems from the different control objects that can focus on the 
results produced, the actions taken or the types of people employed and their shared norms and 
values. The next four sections will outline these groups of control practices, namely results controls, 
action controls, personnel controls, and cultural controls.  
 
Results controls 
 
According to Merchant & Van der Stede (2003), results controls are an indirect form of control since 
they influence employees’ actions by linking rewards to desired results. In addition to monetary 
compensation the rewards include, among others, job security, promotions, autonomy and 
recognition. The authors argue that results controls are an essential prerequisite for employee 
empowerment since they provide a substantial amount of autonomy to the employees. The autonomy 
occurs due to the fact that the employees are being held accountable for the results they produce, not 
the actions they take. In other words, the results controls do not determine the actions employees 
should take but focus their attention to the results to be achieved and, hence, motivate them to take 
appropriate actions they believe will generate the desired results. 
 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) propose four steps that are required for the implementation of 
results controls. First, an organisation should define the right performance dimensions to be 
measured, i.e. dimensions congruent with the organisation’s goals and strategies. Second, it is 
required that the organisation measures performance on these dimensions. Third, the organisation 
ought to set specific targets for every aspect of performance dimension that is measured. Finally, the 
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organisation should provide rewards and punishments to promote the kind of behaviours that are in 
line with the desired results.     
 
Action controls 
 
Whilst results controls are an indirect form of management control, i.e. they do not determine the 
actions employees should take, action controls function vice versa. Indeed, action controls aim to 
ensure that employees perform certain actions that are in the organisation’s best interest. The 
effectiveness and usability depend therefore on the managers’ knowledge of the desired actions as 
well as their ability to ensure that these actions occur. In order to implement action controls 
managers need to know which actions best serve the attainment of organisation’s desired objectives. 
(Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003) According to the authors, action controls come in four different 
forms: behavioural constraints, preaction reviews, action accountability and redundancy.   
 
Behavioural constraints can be applied physically or administratively. Physical constraints include, 
for instance, computer passwords and limits on access to valuable and classified areas. 
Administrative constraints, on the other hand, comprise elements such as the restriction of decision-
making authority (e.g. limiting the amount of expenditures a manager operating at a certain level can 
approve) and separation of duties (e.g. different persons receive checks and make payment entries). 
Preaction reviews refer to both formal and informal reviews of actions. A typical example of a 
formal preaction review is the requirement of approvals for expenditures of certain nature (such as 
capital expenditure). A coffee break conversation between a manager and a subordinate on progress 
of a certain project would be a simple example of an informal preaction review. (Merchant & Van 
der Stede, 2003) 
 
According to Merchant & Van der Stede (2003), action accountability, the third form of action 
controls, relates to the idea of holding employees accountable for the actions they take. The 
requirements for implementing action accountability controls are virtually similar to the 
requirements presented in connection with the results controls. Therefore, in order to implement such 
controls an organisation should first define what actions are acceptable or unacceptable, 
communicate those definitions to employees, observe or otherwise track what happens and, finally, 
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reward appropriate actions and punish unacceptable actions. The authors state that the 
communication of the actions for which employees are held accountable can be carried out in two 
ways, either administratively or socially. Work rules, policies and procedures as well as company 
codes of conduct are typical examples of administrative modes of communication. If the actions are 
not communicated in written form they can be communicated orally for example in meetings or in 
private, face-to-face discussions. Sometimes the desired actions are not communicated at all since 
certain professions (such as lawyer, doctor and auditor) incorporate the premise of acting 
professionally. (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003) 
 
Finally, the authors propose redundancy as the fourth form of action controls. Redundancy refers to 
the assigning of an excessive amount of resources to conduct a task. The idea is to increase the 
probability that a task will be satisfactorily accomplished. However, as Merchant & Van der Stede 
(2003) point out, this is not a very common form of action controls due to its expensive and 
inefficient nature.  
 
Personnel controls 
 
Merchant & Van der Stede (2003) argue that personnel controls are aimed at serving three basic 
purposes and have three major implementation methods. Firstly, personnel controls help to make it 
clear to employees what the organisation expects from them. Secondly, they are of help in ensuring 
that each employee has all the necessary capabilities (such as experience and intelligence) and 
resources (e.g. information, time) to perform a good job. Thirdly, personnel controls may be used to 
increase the likelihood that employees will engage in self-monitoring. 
 
The authors propose that personnel controls can be implemented through three major methods: (1) 
selection and placement of employees, (2) training, and (3) job design and provision of necessary 
resources. According to Merchant & Van der Stede (2003), selection and placement can sometimes 
be regarded as the single most important elements of an MCS (here MCS package). Finding the right 
people in the right place to do a particular job is of highest significance. Therefore, firms devote a 
considerable amount of time and effort to conduct it on a proper basis. Training obviously addresses 
the abovementioned purposes of personnel controls by providing information about organisation’s 
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expectations and the best work practices. Moreover, training can have a positive effect on 
employees’ motivation through giving a greater sense of professionalism. Finally, Merchant and Van 
der Stede (2003) argue that job design and provision of necessary resources can be used to increase 
the probability that an employee will succeed. This could imply, for instance, that employees’ jobs 
are not too complex and there are all the necessary job-specific resources in place. 
 
Cultural controls 
 
Personnel controls seek to increase the likelihood of employees’ self-monitoring, whereas cultural 
controls are used in order to encourage mutual monitoring. As organisation’s culture is based on 
shared traditions, norms, beliefs, values, ideologies, attitudes, and ways of behaving, it creates a 
powerful group pressure on individuals who do not act compliantly. (Merchant & Van der Stede, 
2003).  
 
It is, however, questionable whether managers are able to create or shape organisation’s culture even 
if  they  wanted  to1. Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) admit that cultures remain relatively fixed 
over time, but argue, however, that managers have five different methods of shaping culture (i.e. 
cultural controls): (1) codes of conduct, (2) group-based rewards, (3) intraorganisational transfers, 
(4) physical and social arrangements, and (5) tone at the top. 
 
Codes of conduct refer to formal, written statements that in general terms describe what is meant by 
corporate values and commitments to stakeholders and how these should be reflected in each 
employee’s behaviour. Sometimes codes of conduct may go beyond the above definition and include 
detailed behavioural guidance on specific issues. If the violation of this guidance leads to punitive 
                                                  
1 In this respect there are three perspectives on culture. According to the first, optimistic, view culture can be changed (see e.g. 
O’Reilly, 1989 and Peters & Waterman, 1982). For instance, O’Reilly (1989) argues that it is possible to change or manage a culture 
by choosing the attitudes and behaviours that are required, identifying the norms or expectations that promote or impede them, and 
then taking action to create the desired effect. In contrast, the pessimistic view regards culture as unchangeable. The idea is succinctly 
captured by Hatch (1997, p. 235), who writes: ”Do not think of trying to manage culture. Other people’s meanings and interpretations 
are highly unmanageable. Think instead of trying to culturally manage your organization, that is, manage your organization with 
cultural awareness of the multiplicity of meanings that will be made of you and your efforts.” Finally, the realistic approach adopts a 
more cautious view on culture. Meek (1988, p. 469-470) represents the realistic approach by stating: “Culture as a whole cannot be 
manipulated, turned on or off, although it needs to be recognised that some [organisations] are in a better position than others to 
intentionally influence aspects of it.... culture should be regarded as something an organisation "is", not something it "has": it is not an 
independent variable nor can it be created, discovered or destroyed by the whims of management.” 
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consequences the type of control would rather be classified as an action control. Group-based 
rewards  can  also  be  seen  as  an  overlapping  control  practice  due  to  its  close  relation  to  results  
controls. The difference lies, according to the authors, in their different focus on rewards given for 
individual accomplishment. Consequently, the primary objective of group-based rewards is not to 
motivate the group members to achieve the rewards, but to reinforce communication of expectations 
and mutual monitoring within the group. (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003) 
 
Intraorganisational transfers seek to transmit culture through employee rotation. It is assumed that 
moving managers among functions and divisions will provide managers with a better understanding 
of the organisation as a whole. Physical arrangements (e.g. office plans, architecture and interior 
décor) and social arrangements (e.g. dress codes and vocabulary) can also be of help in shaping 
organisational culture. Finally, the authors propose that a proper tone at the top, which comes across 
through managers’ statements and behaviours, is a way to shape the culture of an organisation.  
 
2.2.2 Levers of Control Framework 
 
The control framework of Simons (1990, 1991, 1995, 2000) is a widely used frame in the existing 
management accounting literature2. The framework (see Appendix B) consists of four control 
systems: (1) beliefs, (2) boundary, (3) diagnostic, and (4) interactive systems. Simons (2000, p. 301) 
emphasises that an effective control environment is achieved by integrating all the four levers of 
control, since “The power of these levers in implementing strategy does not lie in how each is used 
alone, but rather in how they complement each other when used together. The interplay of positive 
and negative forces creates a dynamic tension...” 
 
The four levers create tension in that two of the levers (the beliefs and interactive control systems) 
create positive energy, while the remaining two levers create negative energy (Simons, 1995). In 
other words, the beliefs and interactive systems are used to address the organisational need for 
innovation whereas the boundary and diagnostic systems are used to ascertain the achievement of 
                                                  
2 As for the studies addressing differences between diagnostic and interactive control systems, please see e.g. Abernethy & Brownell 
(1999); Bisbe & Otley (2004); Henri (2006).  As for the studies addressing the whole framework and the relationships among the 
levers of control, please see e.g. Tuomela (2005) and Widener (2007). 
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pre-established objectives (Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995, 2000). The following sections provide a more 
detailed picture of these levers of control.  
 
Beliefs and boundary systems 
 
Simons (1995, p. 34) defines beliefs systems as “the explicit set of organizational definitions that 
senior managers communicate formally and reinforce systematically to provide basic values, 
purpose, and direction for the organization”. A beliefs system therefore communicates core values 
related to business strategy in order to inspire employees to engage in search for new opportunities. 
The communication of beliefs is often conducted through a mission or vision statement and credos 
(Simons, 1995; Widener, 2007). According to Simons’ (1995, 2000) definition, these ways of 
communicating beliefs may be considered as a system when they are (1) formal, (2) information-
based, and (3) used by managers to maintain or alter patterns in organisational activities.  
 
Boundary systems, on the other hand, establish limits to strategically undesirable actions. According 
to Simons (1995, p. 39), a boundary system “delineates the acceptable domain of strategic activity 
for organizational participants”. The communication of boundaries is often conducted through codes 
of business conduct (Simons, 1995; Widener, 2007). By imposing such codes of conduct with 
incentives of punitive nature managers try to ensure that subordinates are not engaging in activities 
that could jeopardise the integrity of the business and are not dissipating resources through projects 
or actions that are not in line with the business strategy (Simons, 1995). 
 
To sum up, the beliefs and boundary systems both intend to motivate employees’ opportunity-
seeking; however, the beliefs systems do that in a positive way through inspiration whilst the 
boundary systems do that in a negative way through the demarcation of the opportunity domain. In 
addition, it is worth noting that the beliefs and boundary systems are not cybernetic, i.e. there is no 
feedback process in place that enables corrective actions by managers. Irrespective of the lack of this 
feature these systems provide a domain for organisational search activity and, hence, form a basis for 
diagnostic and interactive systems - more traditional cybernetic management control systems 
(Simons, 1995). 
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Diagnostic and interactive systems 
 
Diagnostic and interactive control systems both refer to feedback and measurement systems but the 
difference between these systems lies in how they are used by managers. That is, managers choose to 
use certain control systems in an interactive manner and others diagnostically (Simons, 1990). 
Diagnostic systems are designed to ensure predictable goal achievement and, thus, the 
implementation of intended strategies (Simons, 1995, 2000). Furthermore, these systems allow 
managers to monitor and reward the achievement of pre-established goals through the review of 
critical performance variables. Diagnostic systems, in tandem with the boundary systems, intend to 
constrain employees’ behaviour and allocate scarce attention (Simons, 2000).  
 
Contrary to the diagnostic control systems, managers pay frequent and regular attention to interactive 
control systems and, hence, are personally involved in them. This attention signals the need for all 
organisational members to focus on the issues addressed by interactive systems, i.e. issues that are of 
strategic importance. This is expected to foster active and frequent dialogue and debate on strategic 
uncertainties. Therefore, interactive control systems activate organisational learning and, eventually, 
the emergence of new strategies. (Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995, 2000) 
 
To summarise, the primary purpose of using feedback and measurement systems diagnostically is to 
provide motivation and direction to achieve organisational goals, whereas an interactive use of 
control systems intends to stimulate dialogue and organisational learning. In respect of the 
organisational learning, Simons (1995) argues that diagnostic control systems facilitate single-loop 
learning, whereas interactive control systems facilitate double-loop learning3. Finally, Simons (1995) 
emphasises that managers choose usually only one management control system to be used 
interactively (typically project management systems, profit planning systems, brand revenue budgets, 
intelligence systems and human development systems (Simons, 1991)) and that the control system 
used interactively in one firm may be used diagnostically in another.      
                                                  
3 Argyris (1977) defines organisational learning as the process whereby members of the organisation respond to changes in the internal 
and external environments of the organisation by detecting errors which they then correct so as to maintain the central features of the 
organisation. When the process enables the organisation to carry on its present policies or achieve its objectives, the process may be 
called single-loop learning. When learning encompasses not only detecting errors but also questioning underlying policies and goals it 
may be called double-loop learning.  
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2.2.3 MCSP Typology by Malmi & Brown 
 
Malmi & Brown’s (2008) conceptual typology of an MCS package is based on the work of Brown 
(2005), who developed the typology by analysing and synthesising nearly four decades of MCS 
research. According to Malmi & Brown (2008), the typology provides a sufficiently broad, yet 
parsimonious, approach for studying the phenomenon empirically. In addition, they state that the aim 
of  the  typology  is  to  “facilitate  and  stimulate  discussion  and  research  in  this  area,  rather  than  
suggesting a final solution to all related conceptual problems” (p. 291). As can be seen from Figure 
1, the framework encompasses five types of controls: (1) planning, (2) cybernetic, (3) reward and 
compensation, (4) administrative, and (5) cultural controls. The following sections will outline these 
controls in more detail (presented also in Appendix C).   
 
Figure 1. Management Control Systems Package by Malmi & Brown (2008) 
 
Cultural Controls 
Clans Values  Symbols 
Planning Cybernetic Controls 
Reward and 
Compensation Long 
range 
planning 
Action 
planning Budgets 
Financial 
Measurement 
Systems 
Non Financial 
Measurement 
Systems 
Hybrid 
Measurement 
Systems 
Administrative Controls 
Governance Structure Organisation Structure Policies and Procedures 
 
Planning controls 
 
Malmi & Brown (2008) divide planning into action planning and long-range planning. The former 
has a tactical focus and it determines goals and actions for the immediate future (usually a twelve-
month period). The latter has a more strategic focus and it establishes goals and actions for the 
medium and long run. The authors argue that planning can be considered as an ex ante form of 
control due to three specific reasons. Firstly, planning directs effort and behaviour by setting out the 
goals of the functional areas of the organisation. Secondly, by providing the standards to be achieved 
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in relation to the goals, planning clarifies the level of effort and behaviour expected from the 
members of organisation. Thirdly, planning can assist in achieving goal congruence across 
organisation’s functional areas, thereby controlling the activities of groups and individuals. 
 
In addition, the authors point out that planning can accomplish two distinct tasks. First, it may be 
used to support ex ante decision-making. Second, it may be used as illustrated above, i.e. to create 
goal congruence within organisations. To be loyal to the MCS definition presented above, in the first 
case planning should not be labelled as an MCS, whereas in the latter case it should.      
 
Cybernetic controls 
 
Cybernetic controls base their functioning literally on the cybernetic logic. According to Otley & 
Berry (1980), control, in its full cybernetic sense, means monitoring activities and taking action in 
order to ensure that desired ends are attained. Malmi & Brown (2008) cite Green & Welsh (1988) in 
defining cybernetic control as having five specific characteristics (see Appendix C). In addition, 
Malmi & Brown (2008) emphasise that a cybernetic system can either be a decision support system 
or control system depending upon how it is used. Consequently, they state that “the linking of 
behaviour to targets, and establishing of accountability for variations in performance takes a 
cybernetic system from being an information system to support decisions, to a management control 
system” (p. 292). 
  
Cybernetic controls contain four systems of which each has a significant prior literature stream 
associated with it, namely (1) budgeting, (2) financial measures, (3) non-financial measures and (4) 
hybrids that encompass both financial and non-financial measures. Regardless of a considerable 
amount of criticism, budgeting still has a role to play in contemporary organisations (Ekholm & 
Wallin, 2001). Specifically, when used as a control system, budgeting focuses on planning 
acceptable levels of behaviour and evaluating performance in the light of those plans (Malmi & 
Brown, 2008).  
 
Financial measurement systems hold employees accountable for certain financial measures. These 
could include for example economic value added (EVA) and return on investment. Non-financial 
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measures are perceived as important for today’s organisations especially due to their ability to 
identify the drivers of performance as well as to overcome the shortcomings of financial measures. 
(Malmi  &  Brown,  2008)  A  typical  example  of  a  hybrid  measurement  system  is  the  Balanced  
Scorecard (BSC), which has received considerable attention amongst academics and practitioners in 
recent years4.     
 
Reward and compensation controls 
 
Reward and compensation controls intend to motivate and increase the performance of individuals 
and groups within organisations by attaching rewards to the achievement of goals. It has been argued 
that reward and compensation controls are of help in controlling employees effort direction (the tasks 
individuals focus on), effort duration (how long individuals devote themselves to the task), and effort 
intensity (the amount of attention individuals devote to the task). (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002 cited in 
Malmi & Brown, 2008) 
 
Malmi & Brown (2008) posit that organisations tend to provide rewards and compensation for 
various reasons, i.e. not all rewards and compensation are linked to cybernetic controls. 
Organisations may, for instance, attempt to retain its employees through rewards. Therefore, it is 
important to consider “alternative reward and compensation schemes, their intended purposes, and 
their links to various controls” (Malmi & Brown, 2008, p. 293). 
 
Administrative controls 
 
There are three groups of administrative control systems that Malmi & Brown (2008) argue will be 
of assistance in directing employee behaviour; organisation design and structure, governance 
structure as well as procedures and policies. Organisational design and structure work as control 
systems through organising individuals and groups in a way that both encourages certain types of 
contact and relationships, and enables employees’ consistent and predictable behaviour. Malmi & 
Brown (2008) emphasise that as the design and structure of an organisation are alterable from 
                                                  
4 For a more comprehensive view on BSC and the effectiveness of BSC, please see e.g. Davis & Albright, 2004; Ittner et al, 2003; 
Kaplan & Norton, 1992, 1993, 1996a, 1996b and Malina & Selto, 2001. 
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managers’ perspective, they can be categorised as control systems, as opposed to consider them as a 
contextual variable. This view is supported by Otley & Berry (1980, p. 232) who state: “Indeed, 
organisation can itself be viewed as a control process, occurring when groups of people feel the need 
to co-operate in order to achieve purposes which require their joint actions.” 
 
In general, governance structures within the firm direct employee behaviour through the monitoring 
of behaviour and the formal lines of authority and accountability (Malmi & Brown, 2008). More 
specifically, the authors propose that governance structures encompass, for instance, company’s 
board structure and composition, various management and project teams, and systems (such as 
meetings and meeting schedules) that enable various functions and organisational units to co-
ordinate their activities both vertically and horizontally. 
 
Policies and procedures apply bureaucratic approach to directing employee behaviour. Hence, 
policies and procedures include e.g. standard operating procedures as well as rules and policies. In 
addition, action controls (i.e. behavioural constrains, pre-action reviews, and action accountability) 
proposed by Merchant & Van der Stede (2003) reckon among policies and procedures. (Malmi & 
Brown, 2008)  
 
Cultural controls  
 
The debatable question whether organisational culture can be labelled as an MCS, i.e. whether 
managers are able to use culture as a device or system in order to ensure that the behaviours and 
decisions of their employees are consistent with the organisation’s objectives and strategies was 
discussed above. According to Malmi & Brown (2008), culture is a control system when it is used to 
regulate behaviour. Therefore, the authors explicitly assume that it is rather a matter of whether 
managers desire to use culture as a control system or not. This study acknowledges that culture is 
relatively stable across time and might occasionally be beyond managers’ scope for control, but, 
nevertheless, it is assumed here that culture can be used - at least to some degree - as an MCS. 
 
Malmi & Brown (2008) suggest three aspects of cultural controls: (1) value-based controls, (2) 
symbol-based controls, and (3) clan controls. Value-based controls are based on Simons’ (1995) 
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beliefs systems, which intend to communicate core values derived from a company’s business 
strategy. Malmi & Brown (2008) argue that values have an effect on behaviour through a three-level 
process. The first level refers to a deliberate recruiting of individuals whose values are in line with 
those of the organisation. On the second level individuals are socialised in an attempt to change their 
values to comply with the organisational values. Finally, “values are explicated and employees 
behave in accord with them, even if they do not adhere to them personally” (p. 294). 
 
Symbol-based controls refer to visible expressions that organisations create to develop a culture of a 
particular type. These could include for example a building / work space design and dress codes. For 
instance, according to Malmi & Brown (2008), an open plan office could be put in place in an 
attempt to create a culture of communication and collaboration. The third group of cultural controls, 
i.e. clan controls, rest upon an assumption that organisations have distinct subcultures, or clans, and 
that each clan has members who share a set of skills and values instilled in them through a 
socialisation process. Clan controls direct employee behaviour by establishing values and beliefs 
through ceremonies and rituals of the clan. (Malmi & Brown, 2008) 
 
2.2.4 Discussion on Presented Frameworks 
 
First of all, it is worth noting that Simons’ (1990, 1991, 1995, 2000) framework emphasises rather 
the distribution of management attention among control systems than the different types of control 
systems available for senior management. In addition, the distinction between diagnostic and 
interactive systems relates to the way in which certain control systems are used by senior 
management. In other words, Simons argues that a specific MCS can be used either diagnostically or 
interactively5. As one of the main purposes of this thesis is to examine the forms that MCS packages 
take in practice, Simons’ framework does not provide a sufficiently broad conceptualisation in terms 
of various management control devices and systems. On the basis of prior studies, Simons’ 
                                                  
5 Bisbe  et  al.  (2007)  argue  that  Simons’  interactive use of control systems is one of the most ambiguous constructs in the MCS 
research. The authors identify five properties of interactive control systems: (1) an intensive use by top management, (2) an intensive 
use by operating managers, (3) a pervasiveness of face-to-face challenges and debates, (4) a focus on strategic uncertainties, and (5) a 
non-invasive, facilitating and inspirational involvement. That is, the question whether or not an MCS is used interactively is contingent 
upon the intensity of use, intensity of communication as well as the content and nature of communication.  
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framework appears to be better suited for MCS studies addressing strategy formulation, 
implementation and change.    
 
After all, the object-of-control framework proposed by Merchant & Van der Stede (2003) is 
relatively similar to the typology of Malmi & Brown (2008). However, there are three main 
differences that deserve consideration. Firstly, Malmi & Brown (2008) consider planning as a 
separate type of management control, whereas Merchant & Van der Stede (2003) take a narrower 
view by classifying planning (as well as budgeting) as a subtype of financial results controls. Malmi 
& Brown (2008) appropriately argue that planning as an MCS does not necessarily require any link 
to finance. Indeed, Malmi & Brown (2008) include strategic and operational planning in 
management controls as long as they are effective in directing what people do. Regardless of this 
difference neither of the frameworks explicitly fails to consider planning as a way to direct employee 
behaviour, which is contrary to Fisher (1998), who argues that control is separable from the planning 
aspect. Simons (1995), in turn, argues that strategic planning can never be an interactive control 
system, since it focuses on strategy implementation which is rather inherent to diagnostic control 
systems. 
 
Secondly, Malmi & Brown (2008) propose a more extensive conceptualisation of administrative 
controls available to managers - including organisational structure, which has commonly been 
regarded as a contingent variable by prior MCS research. Moreover, Merchant & Van der Stede’s 
(2003) action controls (i.e. behavioural constraints, pre-action reviews, and action accountability) 
represent only one third (policies and procedures) of what Malmi & Brown (2008) propose are 
available administrative controls. Thirdly, the frameworks appear to classify control systems of an 
equivalent nature under different groups of controls. Specifically, whilst Merchant & Van der Stede 
(2003) consider personnel controls (selection and placement, training, as well as job design and 
provision of the necessary resources) as a distinct group of controls, Malmi & Brown (2008) would 
include selection under cultural controls, placement and job design under administrative controls, 
and training under both cultural and administrative controls depending on the purpose of the training. 
The provision of necessary resources would not, however, classify as an MCS since it is merely a 
prerequisite for proper work and does not direct employee behaviour as such (Malmi & Brown, 
2008).  
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In respect of Malmi & Brown’s (2008) typology, it is important to bear in mind that the typology as 
such lacks reputation as a generally accepted framework. Notwithstanding the lack of prior empirical 
research, the typology is a synthesis of significant MCS studies and, hence, possesses a considerable 
amount of academic background. The strength of the framework lies in the broad scope of controls it 
includes in the MCSP. In addition, the way in which Malmi & Brown (2008) have pictured the 
different controls in Figure 1 is not irrelevant. Cultural controls at the top indicate that they are 
assumed to represent broad, yet subtle controls that are slow to change and, thus, provide a 
contextual frame for other controls. Planning, cybernetic, and reward and compensation controls are 
presumably tightly linked in practice and, thus, are presented in sequential order from left to right. 
Finally, administrative controls at the bottom “create the structure in which planning, cybernetic, and 
reward and compensation control are exercised” (Malmi & Brown, 2008, p. 295). In conclusion, the 
typology of Malmi & Brown (2008) provides us with an umbrella under which MCS packages can 
be studied in a more comprehensive fashion.  
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3. PERFORMANCE 
 
This section addresses the concept of performance and pays particular attention to organisational 
ambidexterity, which represents the measure of performance in this thesis. Furthermore, this section 
seeks to make it clear why economic perspective alone is not sufficient in assessing the possible 
performance implications of MCS. Once the foundation for other than financial performance 
implications has been rationalised, the section turns to introduce the concept of organisational 
ambidexterity by elucidating the prior research on the topic and, especially, on the antecedents of 
organisational ambidexterity.  
 
3.1 PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS 
 
If a broad view on the current MCS literature is adopted, one can identify a wide variety of 
performance implications that have been argued to stem from MCS6. A certain line of MCS research 
has focused on examining performance implications at the individual level by addressing issues such 
as motivation (see e.g. Kenis, 1979; Merchant 1981; Malina & Selto, 2001 and Hall, 2008), and role 
stress and clarity (see e.g. Burney & Widener, 2007 and Hall, 2008). At the organisational level the 
research has focused, along with the financial performance, on issues such as effective direction of 
attention (see e.g. Simons, 1990; Kaplan & Norton, 1992 and Widener, 2007), organisational 
learning (see e.g. Simons, 1990, 1995, 2000; Kloot, 1999, Chenhall, 2005; Henri, 2006 and Widener, 
2007) as well as strategic management (see e.g. Simons, 1990, 1995, 2000; Kaplan & Norton, 1996; 
Abernethy & Brownell, 1999, Malina & Selto, 2001 and Chenhall, 2005).  
 
However, a major part of the literature has tended to restrict itself to considering only financial 
aspects of performance (Otley, 1999). According to Otley (2001), performance is inherently multi-
dimensional since different aspects of performance are relevant to different stakeholders. 
Furthermore, he argues that effectiveness can be assessed only in terms of objectives and strategy, 
and that the objectives of even a commercial enterprise cannot be reduced to the purely financial. 
                                                  
6 A broad view refers to the fact that performance is inherently an ambiguous term. As Otley (1999) argues, the term does not specify 
to whom the performance is delivered. 
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Therefore, Otley (2001) asserts that the effectiveness of an organisation could appropriately be 
measured through a capability aspect which refers to an organisation’s potential to perform in the 
future periods. Moreover, he believes that this variable would reveal whether increasing efficiencies 
have been extracted from the organisational activities at the expense of adaptability. Otley’s 
argument lends support to the choosing of organisational ambidexterity as the measure of 
performance, since it has been argued that the ability of an organisation to remain successful over 
long periods hinges on its ability to engage in both exploration and exploitation (Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 1996). 
 
3.2 ORGANISATIONAL AMBIDEXTERITY 
 
“The basic problem confronting an organization is to engage in sufficient exploitation to 
ensure its current viability and, at the same time, to devote enough energy to exploration 
to ensure its future viability.” Levinthal and March (1993, p. 105) 
 
3.2.1 Definition of Organisational Ambidexterity 
 
As Levinthal & March (1993) succinctly write, excelling at both exploration and exploitation (i.e. 
being ambidextrous) is deemed to be critical for firm survival and prosperity (Duncan, 1976; Gibson 
& Birkinshaw, 2004; He & Wong, 2004; March, 1991; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Whilst the term 
organisational ambidexterity was initially used by Duncan (1976), it is March’s (1991) pioneering 
article that has launched the increasing research on organisational adaptation (Gupta et al, 2006; 
O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008). The idea of the simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation is 
well summarised by Levinthal & March (1993, p. 105) who state that “an organization that engages 
exclusively in exploration will ordinarily suffer from the fact that it never gains the returns of its 
knowledge”, and, on the other hand, “an organization that engages exclusively in exploitation will 
ordinarily suffer from obsolescence”. While the ambidexterity literature is virtually unanimous that 
organisations must engage both in exploration and exploitation and reach a balance between the two, 
some scholars have argued that such a consensus is somewhat premature and does not necessarily 
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apply to all contexts. Gupta et al (2006), for instance, assert that, under certain conditions, 
ambidexterity could be achieved at the level of a broader social system that encompasses multiple 
organisations. Therefore, the argument goes, if the balance between exploration and exploitation is 
achieved at the social system level it is justifiable that single organisations could focus solely on 
exploration or exploitation7.   
 
Achieving ambidexterity is by no means easy, since exploration and exploitation require 
fundamentally different and inconsistent architectures, competencies, structures, strategies and 
contexts (Jansen et al, 2008b; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). Indeed, O’Reilly & Tushman (2008) 
argue that exploration refers to search, discovery, autonomy, innovation, and embracing variation 
whereas exploitation, in contrast, refers to efficiency, increasing productivity, control, certainty, and 
variance reduction. Notwithstanding the obvious challenge to manage these contradictory tensions, 
the scholars have started to propose an increasing array of means how organisations achieve 
organisational ambidexterity (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). These antecedents of ambidexterity will 
be elaborated further in the section 3.2.3. 
 
To sum up, organisational ambidexterity can be viewed as an organisation’s ability to be aligned and 
efficient in its management of today’s business demands while, at the same time, being adaptive to 
the changing environment demands (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
Tushman & O’Reilly (1996) adopt a more innovation focused view and argue that an ambidextrous 
firm has a capability to both compete in mature markets (where cost, efficiency, and incremental 
innovation are critical) and to develop new products and services for emerging markets (where 
radical innovation, speed, and flexibility are critical). In keeping with the original meaning of the 
word “ambidextrous”, ambidexterity can be, in broad terms, defined as organisation’s ability to 
pursue two disparate activities at the same time (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004).   
 
 
                                                  
7 Gupta et al (2006) use the semiconductor industry as an example of a broader social system that enables single organizations to focus 
solely on exploration or exploitation. The semiconductor industry, they argue, is experiencing an ongoing disaggregation into “fabless” 
semiconductor companies (which only do product R&D) and fabrication companies (which only do contract manufacturing). 
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3.2.2 Prior Literature 
 
Prior research on organisational ambidexterity comprises various literature streams. The theoretical 
lens through which the contradictory terms “exploration” and “exploitation” have been examined 
includes organisational learning, technological innovation, organisational adaptation, strategic 
management, organisational design, competitive advantage and organisational survival (Gupta et al, 
2006; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). In the contexts of organisational learning, technological 
innovation, organisational adaptation, strategic management, and organisational design the scholars 
have related organisational ambidexterity to concepts such as single-loop and double-loop learning, 
incremental and discontinuous innovation, evolutionary and revolutionary change, induced and 
autonomous strategic processes, and efficiency and flexibility, respectively (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 
2008). This thesis does not explicitly select a specific theoretical lens, but instead adopts a view 
similar to Lubatkin et al (2006). That is, instead of focusing solely on one element of ambidexterity 
this thesis measures the general ambidextrous orientation whose existence (or non-existence) may be 
partly attributable to an MCSP of an organisation. 
 
What the abovementioned elements of organisational ambidexterity have in common is the need for 
organisations to manage a balance between the two paradoxical activities. For example, it has been 
argued that long-term organisational success is achieved through a well-balanced combination of the 
two learning processes (Gupta et al, 2006; Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991). Similarly, a 
concentration solely on evolutionary change could lead to inertia, whereas too many revolutionary 
change actions could create organisational chaos (Levinthal & March, 1993; Tushman & O’Reilly, 
1996). Duncan (1976), in turn, argues that organisations require both organic and mechanistic 
structures (initially introduced by Burns & Stalker, 1961) - the former to create innovations and the 
latter to implement and deploy them.   
 
In addition to the various contexts in which the concept of organisational ambidexterity has been 
examined, the prior literature has also looked into several other interrelations. Some studies have 
focused on the antecedents of ambidexterity (e.g. Beckman, 2006; Jansen et al, 2006; Lubatkin et al, 
2006; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004; Smith & Tushman, 2005), while some have paid particular 
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attention to competitive benefits (e.g. Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; He & Wong, 2004). Moreover, 
some scholars have considered how environmental factors (such as environmental dynamism and 
competitive dynamics) and other moderators (such as market orientation, resource endowment and 
firm scope) affect the relationship between antecedents, elements of ambidexterity and firm 
performance (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
 
In terms of operationalisation, prior research has tried to measure organisational ambidexterity by a 
number of different means. For instance, O’Reilly & Tushman (2008) demonstrate how the life 
expectancy of firms has constantly decreased and yet, regardless of the high failure rates, some firms 
survive and prosper over long periods of time. Hence, it could be thought that in order for a company 
to achieve long life, it must be able to adapt and change. However, even though a company’s long 
life might be an indication of organisational ambidexterity, it could also be argued that not every 
long-lived company is necessarily ambidextrous (e.g. by reason of a specific industry). Therefore, 
prior research has often endeavoured to capture the potential existence of both exploitation and 
exploration through constructs encompassing several items that reflect exploitation and exploration 
(such as existing versus new products and services, and existing versus new customer groups). In 
order to capture the potential existence of organisational ambidexterity, the scholars have for 
example added all the exploitation and exploration items together, subtracted exploitation from 
exploration and used an absolute difference score, and computed a multiplicative interaction between 
exploitation and exploration. These operationalisation issues will be addressed further in the fifth 
section. 
 
Since the purpose of this study is, inter alia, to examine the association of MCSP with organisational 
ambidexterity, this study focuses on and contributes to the research on how companies actually 
achieve organisational ambidexterity. Therefore, it is of highest importance here to outline the 
antecedents of organisational ambidexterity in more detail. 
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3.2.3 Antecedents of Organisational Ambidexterity 
 
There are very few prior studies that have tried to uncover how firms are able to attain organisational 
ambidexterity (Adler et al, 1999; Jansen et al, 2008b). However, over the past decade researchers 
have started to devote more energy to the investigation of organisational ambidexterity’s antecedents 
(Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). Specifically, prior literature suggests three broad approaches that 
enable ambidexterity within an organisation8: (1) structural solutions, (2) contextual solutions, and 
(3) leadership-based solutions (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). It is important to note that these 
approaches are not necessarily substitutes to each other. Conversely, many academics argue that the 
achievement of organisational ambidexterity not only requires separate structural subunits but also 
different competencies, systems, incentives, processes and cultures as well as ambidextrous senior 
teams and managers to be in place concurrently (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004; O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2008; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). However, the next three sections will elaborate on these 
approaches on a separate basis.      
 
Structural solutions 
 
Ambidexterity has been typically viewed in structural terms (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). That is, it 
has been proposed that organisations could manage the conflicting demands of exploration and 
exploitation by putting in place “dual structures” that enable certain business units, or groups within 
business units, to engage in exploration while others engage in exploitation (Duncan, 1976). Gibson 
& Birkinshaw (2004) refer this to as structural ambidexterity. Raisch & Birkinshaw (2008) reviewed 
the relevant ambidexterity literature and came to distinguish between spatial separation and parallel 
structures in respect of structural ambidexterity.  
 
Spatial separation refers to two structurally independent units that pursue either exploration or 
exploitation (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004). Bradach (1997), for example, conducted a field study of 
five large U.S. chain organisations and revealed how chains met their dual objectives of achieving 
                                                  
8 These approaches do not include the solutions that aim to achieve organisational ambidexterity by engaging in only one activity at a 
time. That is to say, means such as externalising either explorative or exploitative activities through outsourcing or by establishing 
alliances as well as temporary cycling through periods of exploration and periods of exploitation are excluded from the analysis of 
organisational antecedents.  
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uniformity and system-wide adaptation by using “plural form” across the company and franchise 
units. Parallel structures, on the other hand, are based on the idea that the paradoxical demands could 
be addressed within a single business unit by creating both the primary task structure to ensure 
efficiency and the supplementary structure (such as project teams or networks) to ensure flexibility 
(Adler et al, 1999). In other words, Adler et al (1999) argue that ambidextrous designs are 
organisational forms that build internally inconsistent architectures and cultures into business units in 
order to facilitate both exploration and exploitation. 
 
Most of the studies addressing structural ambidexterity emphasise that structural separation alone is 
not sufficient in achieving organisational ambidexterity - there is a need for several mechanisms that 
coordinate and integrate exploratory and exploitative efforts across organisational units (Smith & 
Tushman, 2005; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Therefore, the extant body of literature proposes a 
wide array of integration and coordination mechanisms to support structural ambidexterity. These 
integration mechanisms will be presented here under the structural solutions although some of them 
could also classify as behavioural contexts or leadership processes. Therefore, the behavioural 
contexts and leadership processes presented below embrace only antecedents which, according to the 
literature, contribute independently to the achievement of ambidexterity.  
 
It has been largely noted that senior executives play a crucial role in fostering structural 
ambidexterity (He & Wong, 2004; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Smith & 
Tushman, 2005; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). This notion is well captured by Smith & Tushman 
(2005, p. 524), who note: “Where structural differentiation permits firms to explore and exploit, the 
top management team serves as the point of integration between these contrasting agendas.” 
Correspondingly, O’Reilly & Tushman (2008, p. 191) echoe the need for integration as follows: 
“The crucial task here is not the simple organisational structural decision in which the exploratory 
and exploitative subunits are separated, but the process by which these units are integrated in a 
value-enhancing way.”   
 
What do these integration mechanisms include then? O’Reilly & Tushman (2004, 2008) propose a 
set of senior team processes and actions that enable firms to integrate and recombine resources in an 
attempt to promote ambidexterity. These include the following actions and processes: (1) a 
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compelling strategic intent, (2) a clear and common vision and values (relentlessly communicated), 
(3) a strategically aligned senior team with a common-fate incentive system, (4) separate aligned 
organisational architectures (business models, competencies, incentives, metrics, and cultures) with 
targeted integration, and (5) the ability of the senior team to manage the inevitable trade-offs and 
conflicts, i.e. an ambidextrous leadership. Similarly, Smith & Tushman (2005) emphasise the 
strategic decision making and, particularly, the cognitive frames and processes that allow top 
management teams to effectively deal with strategic contradictions. Moreover, Jansen et al (2008a) 
lend support to the above integration mechanisms by asserting that a senior team shared vision and 
contingency rewards are associated with a firm's ability to combine high levels of exploratory and 
exploitative innovations.  
 
Tushman & O’Reilly (1996), besides stressing the importance of ambidextrous managers, emphasise 
the role that a strong, widely shared corporate culture plays in integrating the structurally separate 
units. The authors discuss two examples of firms in which a successful management of 
organisational culture assisted in achieving ambidexterity and competitive advantage as well as two 
examples of firms in which a cultural inertia resulted in failure. According to Tushman & O’Reilly 
(1996), a tight-loose culture that provides consistency, promotes trust, and encourages identification 
and sharing of information and resources, is crucial for ambidextrous organisations.   
 
Jansen et al (2008b) delineate structural ambidexterity and integration mechanisms in a different 
way. Instead of predicting a direct relationship between structural differentiation and ambidexterity, 
they examined how formal and informal senior team integration mechanisms as well as formal and 
informal organisational integration mechanisms mediate the relationship between structural 
differentiation and ambidexterity. The result of the study suggests that the previously asserted effect 
of structural differentiation on ambidexterity is indirect, operating through both informal senior team 
integration (that is, senior team social integration) and formal organisational integration (that is, 
cross-functional interfaces) mechanisms.   
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Contextual solutions 
 
Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) provide another path to ambidexterity. They developed the concept of 
contextual ambidexterity and defined it as “the behavioural capacity to simultaneously demonstrate 
alignment and adaptability across an entire business unit” (p. 209). Instead of structural solutions, 
ambidexterity, they argue, is best achieved by building a business-unit context that encourages 
individuals to make their own judgments as to how best divide the contradictory demands for 
alignment-oriented and adaptation-oriented activities9 (akin to exploitation and exploration). This 
logic that relies on individual employees to make their own choices is consistent with Adler et al 
(1999) who propose two specific mechanisms for reconciling the inherent tension between efficiency 
and flexibility: (1) meta-routines for systematising the creative process and (2) job enrichment 
schemes that enable workers to become more innovative and flexible in their routine tasks. Based on 
a survey of 41 business units of 10 multinational firms Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) argue that a 
context characterised by a combination of stretch, discipline, support, and trust facilitates contextual 
ambidexterity. According to Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004), stretch and discipline represent the 
“performance management context” whereas support and trust form the “social context”. 
Furthermore, the authors stress the importance of senior executives who put in place systems that 
allow supportive contexts to emerge.    
 
Also, Jansen et al (2005, 2006) have contributed to the research on contextual ambidexterity by 
examining exploratory and exploitative innovation at a large European financial services firm. The 
results of the former study indicate that a combination of decentralisation and connectedness 
enhances a unit’s ambidexterity and its ability to pursue exploratory and exploitative innovations 
simultaneously. The results of the latter study suggest that managers may develop densely connected 
social relations in an endeavour to increase a unit’s contextual ambidexterity. In these studies, 
decentralisation  refers  to  the  extent  to  which  authority  is  delegated  to  lower  levels  of  an  
organisational hierarchy. Connectedness, in turn, is defined as the density of social relations that 
serves as a governance mechanism and facilitates the exchange of knowledge. Therefore, in light of 
                                                  
9 Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004, p. 209) define alignment and adaptability as follows: “Alignment refers to coherence among all the 
patterns of activities in the business unit; they are working together toward the same goals. Adaptability refers to the capacity to 
reconfigure activities in the business unit quickly to meet changing demands in the task environment.” 
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the earlier studies, it seems that contextual ambidexterity could be attained by creating a context 
encompassing both formal (decentralisation, stretch, and discipline) and informal (connectedness, 
support, and trust) mechanisms to develop concurrent and complex behavioural responses that foster 
ambidexterity. 
 
Leadership-based solutions 
 
The critical role that senior executives play in nurturing ambidexterity was stressed in connection 
with both the structural and contextual ambidexterity. However, leadership processes are 
increasingly conceptualised as an independent antecedent of organisational ambidexterity (Raisch & 
Birkinshaw, 2008). For example, Lubatkin et al (2006) argue that the ability to jointly pursue 
exploration and exploitation in small- to medium-sized firms hinges on the extent to which their top 
management teams are behaviourally integrated. The authors conceptualise behavioural integration 
to comprise three interrelated and mutually reinforcing top management team processes, namely 
collaborative behaviour, information exchange, and joint decision making. Moreover, the results of 
the survey of 139 small- to medium-sized firms suggest that top management team behavioural 
integration, which represents the level of wholeness and unity of effort, facilitates the processing of 
disparate demands essential to attaining ambidexterity.    
 
Beckman (2006), on the other hand, examined the founding team composition and, in particular, its 
members’ prior company affiliations as antecedents of organisational ambidexterity. She found out 
that the founding teams with common prior company affiliations engaged in exploitation, whereas 
diverse prior affiliations encouraged exploration. A mix of both diverse and common team 
affiliations was found to be a precursor to organisational ambidexterity. To sum up, it seems that the 
following top management team related issues are essential when aiming at ambidexterity: (1) a 
founding team possessing both diverse and common prior company affiliations, (2) the level of the 
team’s collaborative behaviour, (3) the quantity and quality of information exchanged, and (4) an 
emphasis on joint decision making. 
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4. MCS PACKAGE AND AMBIDEXTERITY 
 
This section discusses how the previously presented variables, MCSP and organisational 
ambidexterity, interrelate with each other in light of the extant body of research. Since the two 
concepts stem from the very different literature streams and the extent to which the prior research has 
examined the relationship of the two is noticeably scarce, the synthesis made here is believed to be of 
considerable relevance before turning to the empirical part of the thesis. Therefore, this section 
provides the foundation upon which the analysis and discussion can be built in the forthcoming 
sections.  
 
The following will outline the linkages between organisational ambidexterity and the different 
elements  of  an  MCSP  as  presented  by  Malmi  &  Brown  (2008).  Although  the  linkages  will  be  
presented on a separate control element basis it is of important note that this study does not aim to 
explore whether a certain control element alone acts as an antecedent of organisational 
ambidexterity, but to examine whether a package of certain configuration(s) promotes ambidexterity. 
This view is in line with the one of Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004, p. 210), who argue that 
ambidexterity “is achieved by building a carefully selected set of systems and processes that 
collectively define a context that allows…alignment and adaptability to simultaneously flourish” 
(emphasis added).  
 
4.1 PLANNING CONTROLS AND AMBIDEXTERITY 
 
There are no studies that explicitly relate planning to the achievement of organisational 
ambidexterity. However, O’Reilly & Tushman (2008) argue that an aligned senior team with a 
compelling strategic intent is needed as an integration mechanism in an attempt to promote 
ambidexterity. Malmi & Brown (2008), on the other hand, assert that planning can be used to create 
goal congruence within organisations. Thus, it can be argued that planning could serve as a process 
through which the senior team of an organisation jointly reaches a consensus among its members on 
how to best resolve the tensions inevitably resulting from the contradictory demands of exploration 
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and exploitation, which, in turn, has been argued to contribute to the attainment of ambidexterity 
(Lubatkin et al, 2006; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004, 2008). Furthermore, as Malmi & Brown (2008) 
divide planning into action and long-range planning, planning processes arguably take place on a 
recurring basis in organisations and may thereby provide a potential arena through which the 
importance of both exploration and exploitation can be justified and the required integration reached. 
 
4.2 CYBERNETIC CONTROLS AND AMBIDEXTERITY 
 
Neither are there studies that explicitly examine the relationship between cybernetic controls 
(budgets, financial and non-financial measurement systems, and hybrid measurement systems) and 
organisational ambidexterity10. Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) measured organisation context partly 
by a performance management factor, which consisted of questions related to performance 
measurement. Hence, it can be reasoned that different cybernetic control systems contribute to the 
creation of an organisation context (Davila, 2005) which encourages ambidexterity. For instance, 
consider an organisation that utilises BSC and aims to implement an ambidextrous strategy. 
Translating the ambidextrous strategy effectively into action would mean that the different measures 
of the BSC should reflect the desired actions and behaviours which are in line with the strategy (see 
e.g. Kaplan & Norton, 1993) and, thus, thought to be essential in achieving ambidexterity. Therefore, 
at least at the individual employee level (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), it is theoretically reasonable 
that various measurement systems could be used to promote ambidexterity. 
 
Budgets, as they still have a role to play in contemporary organisations (Ekholm & Wallin, 2000) 
and serve multiple purposes in organisations, for example, operational planning, performance 
evaluation, communication of goals and strategy formation (Hansen & Van der Stede, 2004), are 
arguably control systems that can have an influence on an organisation context and, hence, on 
                                                  
10 Of important note is that the MCS literature is increasingly adopting an alternative view on formal MCS, which have traditionally 
been regarded as systems that impose standardisation and reject innovations. The emerging view, which sees MCS as systems that 
support organisations in their effort to respond and adapt to changing environments, is captured by Davila (2005, p. 37), who writes: 
“Rather than a rigid mould that rejects the unexpected, MCS may be flexible and dynamic, adapting and evolving to the unpredictable 
needs of innovation, but stable enough to frame cognitive models, communication patterns, and actions.” Davila (2005) discusses the 
different roles that formal MCS may play in managing various types of innovation, i.e. incremental and radical innovations (cf. 
incremental and discontinuous innovations proposed by O’Reilly & Tushman (2004)). The author asserts that measurement systems 
(such as BSC) may be used as interactive systems (Simons, 1995) that highlight opportunities for incremental innovations as well as 
for radical changes, but, otherwise, he does not discuss how these various types of innovation could be achieved concurrently. 
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organisational ambidexterity (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Specifically, the argument of Jansen et 
al (2008, p. 8) that organisational ambidexterity refers to “the routines and processes by which 
organizations…allocate, reallocate, combine and recombine resources and assets across 
differentiated units” lends support to this view since resource allocation is generally viewed as a 
potential reason why organisations use budgets11. 
 
4.3 REWARD AND COMPENSATION CONTROLS AND AMBIDEXTERITY 
 
Incentive systems are a commonly proposed integration mechanism in the ambidexterity literature. 
Indeed, while most studies build upon the assumption that ambidexterity is for the most part 
achieved through a structural arrangement, the number of studies suggesting that incentive systems 
have a standalone value in achieving organisational ambidexterity is virtually zero. Therefore, the 
studies presented in the following consider incentive systems as an integration mechanism needed to 
support the structural separation.   
 
In illustrating how ambidexterity was operationalised in two organisations, USA Today, a national 
newspaper, and Ciba Vision, a company engaged in contact lenses and related eye-care products, 
O’Reilly & Tushman (2004) described how the organisations revamped their incentive systems by 
replacing the unit-specific goals with an incentive system rewarding managers primarily for the 
overall company performance. Similarly, Jansen et al (2008a) conclude that senior team contingency 
rewards are of assistance in reconciling the considerable challenges that ambidexterity poses on 
senior teams in organisations. O’Reilly &Tushman (2008) point also to the fact that there needs to be 
a common incentive system for the senior team in place that is anchored on the company-wide 
metrics, not on the success of a separate unit. 
 
Despite the apparent consensus among academics on the role that reward and compensations systems 
play in ambidextrous organisations, not every study supports this line of argument. Jansen et al 
(2008a) found no significant evidence that senior team contingency rewards contribute to the 
                                                  
11 For a more comprehensive review of the potential reasons for which organisations use budgets, please see Hansen & Van der Stede 
(2004, p. 418). 
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achievement of ambidexterity. They acknowledge that senior team contingency rewards may be 
beneficial under certain organisational and industrial conditions but, however, question whether an 
establishment of outcome interdependency through such rewards actually results in balanced 
decision-making and effective management of strategic contradictions in senior teams. 
 
4.4 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AND AMBIDEXTERITY 
 
Administrative controls, encompassing organisation design and structure, governance structure, and 
policies and procedures (Malmi & Brown, 2008), have several linkages to the current literature on 
organisational ambidexterity. In particular, the achievement of ambidexterity through a structural 
solution (both spatial separation and parallel structures) has been widely proposed (e.g. Adler et al, 
1999; O’Reilly & Tushman 2004, 2008; Jansen et al, 2008b). Since a design and structure of an 
organisation are considered to be alterable by senior managers and are thus labelled as MCS (Malmi 
& Brown, 2008) the structural requirements that ambidexterity poses can potentially be addressed by 
an MCSP.  
 
Moreover, most of the proposed integration mechanisms have linkages to administrative controls. 
Cross-functional interfaces, such as liaison personnel, task forces, and teams (Jansen et al, 2008b), 
integrating meetings (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004), centralisation / decentralisation, i.e. the extent to 
which decision making is concentrated in an organisation (Jansen et al, 2005, 2006) as well as the 
composition of the top management team (Beckman, 2006) are all matters that, according to Malmi 
& Brown (2008), fall inside the scope of the governance structures. However, the composition of the 
top management team could also be considered as a matter of selection and placement in which case 
it would be regarded as a cultural control (Malmi & Brown, 2008).  
 
Finally, the policies and procedures lie at the heart of formalisation which Jansen et al (2005, 2006) 
consider as an organisational antecedent of ambidexterity. Furthermore, the policies and procedures 
arguably have an influence on the supportive organisation context which consists of four behaviour-
framing attributes: discipline, stretch, support, and trust (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) and, hence, 
may serve the achievement of contextual ambidexterity. 
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4.5 CULTURAL CONTROLS AND AMBIDEXTERITY 
 
The MCSP typology of Malmi & Brown (2008) considers three separate cultural controls: value-
based, symbol-based and clan controls, each of which has received more or less attention in the 
ambidexterity literature. What the ambidexterity literature especially emphasises is the significant 
role that culture plays in ambidextrous organisations (e.g. O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 1996). In addition, an overarching vision and values, relentlessly communicated, have been 
proposed to increase the likelihood of ambidexterity (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004, 2008; Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 1996).  
 
Tushman & O’Reilly (1996) argue that cultural inertia, the organisational equivalent of high 
cholesterol, which comes along the success and growth, can form a significant barrier to both 
incremental and discontinuous change to be handled simultaneously. The authors capture this view 
particularly well by raising a relevant question of the common challenge faced by managers across 
countries, industries, and firm sizes: “How can managers diagnose and actively shape organizational 
cultures to both execute today’s strategies and create the capabilities to innovate for tomorrow’s 
competitive demands?” (p. 20).  
 
Malmi & Brown (2008) posit that the organisational culture could be altered, for example, through 
beliefs systems (Simons, 1995), which intend to communicate core values derived from a company’s 
business strategy (e.g. ambidextrous strategy). Moreover, they propose that several symbol-based 
controls (such as building / work space design and dress codes) as well as clan controls could be used 
to develop a culture of a particular type. In respect of the clan controls it could be argued that the top 
management team forms a distinct clan. This would imply another possible linkage between cultural 
controls and organisational ambidexterity, since the demanded behavioural integration of the top 
management team (Lubatkin et al, 2006), for example, could probably be attained through the 
ceremonies and rituals of the clan, if these were used to establish values and beliefs reflecting the 
behavioural integration (collaborative behaviour, information exchange, and joint decision making).   
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It is mentioned in the previous sections that many of the package elements may contribute to the 
creation of a specific context for ambidexterity. The cultural controls appear to make no exception 
since it has been argued that context refers to the systems, processes, and beliefs that shape 
individual-level behaviours in an organisation (Ghosal & Bartlett, 1994). In fact, this definition is not 
far from the one provided by Malmi & Brown (2008), which defines MCS as systems managers use 
to ensure that the behaviours and decisions of their employees are consistent with the organisation’s 
objectives and strategies. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that an MCSP is, among other 
linkages to ambidexterity, crucial in creating an organisation context that allows exploration and 
exploitation to simultaneously take place. 
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5. RESEARCH SITE AND METHOD 
 
This section elaborates on the selected research site, the case study method, and the data collection 
process conducted at the case company. Specifically, the section will first give a brief description of 
the case company, Tekla Oyj, and explain why such an organisation was selected for this thesis. 
Secondly, the section will discuss the appropriateness of adopting a case-based approach when 
studying MCS from a holistic point of view. Finally, the data collection process and the used 
constructs will be reported and validated.  
 
5.1 TEKLA OYJ 
 
Tekla Oyj is a Finnish listed company engaged in developing and marketing model-based software 
solutions, products and services. Tekla is an international company having customers in more than 
80 countries and own offices in twelve countries. Tekla was established in 1966, making it one of the 
oldest software companies in Finland. The Group is headquartered in Espoo, Finland and it employs 
nearly 450 people. Net sales of the Group for 2008 amounted to nearly 60 million euros, of which 
international operations accounted for more than 80 per cent. 
 
The research site was selected primarily due to pre-existing personal contacts that the researcher had 
with the CFO of the organisation studied. Hence, the case study arose from what can be labelled as 
accidental access (Otley & Berry, 1994). Since the contact was made at the group level in the 
organisation, it enabled the researcher to extend the study to encompass both business units and to 
carefully select the most appropriate interviewees. Furthermore, the group level contact provided a 
considerable access to several intra-organisational documents, which allowed the researcher to gain a 
fuller understanding of the issues under investigation. However, a seemingly easy access to data 
sources was not the only aspect to motivate the selection of the case company. Indeed, as it will be 
argued below, Tekla can be regarded as an ambidextrous organisation and, therefore, it appropriately 
serves the purposes of this thesis. 
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As  this  study  pays  particular  attention  to  MCSP  at  the  strategic  business  unit  level,  a  brief  
explanation of both of the business units is provided in order for the reader to gain an appreciation of 
the organisational context within which the various control systems were operating. Since Tekla’s 
model-based software products are used in industries such as building and construction, energy 
distribution, and infrastructure management, the company operates through two distinct business 
units, Building & Construction (B&C) and Infra & Energy (I&E). The following will address each 
unit in more detail. 
 
5.1.1 Building & Construction 
 
Tekla’s Building & Construction business area develops and markets the Tekla Structures software 
product for information-model-based design of steel and concrete structures as well as the 
management of fabrication and construction. B&C has four main customer segments: steel detailers 
and fabricators, construction companies and constructors, precast concrete fabricators, and 
engineering offices. B&C is a large, global, and growth oriented business area which has customers 
in approximately 90 countries. Furthermore, the international subsidiaries in twelve countries are for 
the most part engaged in B&C’s business. 
 
In 2008, the revenue of B&C amounted to 46 million euros of which 95% were generated by 
international operations. The revenue of B&C accounted for almost 80% of Tekla Corporation’s total 
revenue in 2008. However, it should be noted that B&C is strongly dependent upon the situation of 
the global building industry. Therefore, B&C is significantly affected by the current economic 
slowdown having an adverse effect predominantly on the building industry. This was particularly 
evident in the first quarter of 2009 during which the revenue of B&C decreased by 27% year-on-
year. 
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5.1.2 Infra & Energy 
 
Tekla’s Infra & Energy business area focuses on the development and sales of model-based software 
solutions that support customers’ core processes. Its key customer industries encompass energy 
distribution, infrastructure management, water and sewage as well as infrastructure construction. 
I&E's product-based offering also comprises customer projects where product features are developed 
in cooperation with individual customers or customer groups. Revenue of the unit for 2008 totalled 
13 million euros, of which international operations accounted for 39%. The revenue of I&E stood for 
slightly more than 20% of Tekla’s total revenue. 
 
Since the business unit has customers in about 10 countries, it is evidently a less global business than 
B&C. Indeed, whereas B&C is a large, global, and growth oriented business area, I&E is relatively 
small, concentrates mainly to the domestic markets, and is primarily held responsible for profitability 
objectives. Moreover, since municipal and public organisations constitute a considerable part of 
I&E's customers, it is not as vulnerable in the face of economic fluctuations as B&C. Whilst B&C 
faced a significant loss in revenue in the first quarter of 2009, I&E’s revenue for the same period 
increased by 25% year-on-year. In addition, the way in which I&E does its software business is in 
contrast with the one of B&C. Specifically, while I&E’s products are tailored in collaboration with 
customers  and  the  sales  process  of  I&E’s  products  can  take  several  years,  B&C  markets  and  
develops software products that are sold to customers in a “commerce” fashion without major 
customisation.  
 
Both the net sales and operating result of B&C and I&E between 2000 and 2008 are presented in 
Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively. Of important note is that Energy & Utilities and Public Infra 
business areas constitute the basis upon which Infra & Energy business area was created as of 2006.  
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Figure 2. Net Sales by Business Area (2000–2008) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Operating Result by Business Area (2000–2008) 
 
 
 
Taken together, Tekla’s business areas are relatively distinct from each other. Also, during the 
interviews the respondents strongly pointed to the fact that the business units have only few things in 
common and the cooperation between them is virtually non-existent. A Segment Director even stated 
that ‘we are like two different... we have been quite like two different companies’. Moreover, the 
CFO of the company frequently referred to a portfolio management conducted at the group level. In 
respect of MCSP, the CFO commented that ‘in many management systems there is not a Tekla level 
template selected, I&E and B&C are ploughing their own furrows’. The business area specific 
features as well as the potential synergies between the business units are presented in Table 1.     
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Table 1. Specific and Common Features of the Business Areas 
 
 
 
5.2 CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
 
A case-based approach is said to be particularly appropriate in areas where existing theories are 
inadequate or incomplete (Otley & Berry, 1994; Scapens, 1990). Consequently, case studies are 
thought to be useful in generating hypotheses that can be tested later with larger samples (Scapens, 
1990). Furthermore, Otley & Berry (1994) argue that the role of accounting and control cannot be 
fully understood in isolation, which calls for a case-based approach to be adopted. Similarly, 
Humphrey & Scapens (1996) believe that studies of accounting practice cannot be isolated from the 
influence of the wider social and political contexts. Scapens (1990), on the other hand, highlights the 
important role that case studies play in holistic research, a method seeking to locate social systems in 
their particular contexts and predominantly used by holistic researchers in the areas of social 
sciences. In addition, Cooper & Morgan (2008) argue that the case study research approach is useful 
where the phenomena under scrutiny are complex, dynamic and involve many variables.  
 
In respect of the current study and its purposes, the case-based approach seems to provide a 
potentially fruitful method. This is due mainly to four specific factors. First, MCSP typology of 
Malmi  &  Brown  (2008)  is  yet  to  be  examined  empirically  as  a  theoretical  framework.  Second,  
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management accounting is increasingly regarded as normal social science (see Vollmer, 2009). 
Third, an MCSP is all about considering control systems from a holistic point of view, i.e. in their 
wider social, political and organisational contexts. Finally, an MCSP is a complex and dynamic 
matter, which comprises multiple variables within a single framework. Of note is also that within the 
case-based approach, it is believed that the studied phenomena are best captured by interviews 
supported by both internal and external documentation as opposed to a questionnaire. Although some 
questionnaire-based constructs were used, they were filled-in by the researcher during the interviews. 
This enabled the interviewees to comment on and the interviewer to elaborate on the questionnaire 
items, if necessary.      
 
Keating (1995) posits four distinct types of case studies by categorising them by research scope. That 
is to say, case studies are categorised on the basis of their link to theory development process – 
theory discovery, theory refinement, and theory refutation. As this case study draws on a model that 
is assessed and potentially further specified through empirical examination, the current thesis can be 
considered what Keating (1995) labels as “theory specification case”. However, as the study also 
addresses the relation between MCSP and organisational ambidexterity, a phenomenon virtually 
ignored or at least inadequately explained in the current literature, the thesis has also features of what 
Keating (1995) labels as “theory discovery case”. 
 
Scapens (1990) provides another categorisation of different types of case studies. Again, this thesis 
can hardly be classified solely into one of these types, since the study has features of both descriptive 
and  exploratory  case  studies.  That  is  to  say,  the  current  case  study  does  not  only  endeavour  to  
provide a description and comparison of the MCSPs used in practice, but also to explore reasons for 
possible attainment of organisational ambidexterity. However, to disentangle one type of case study 
from another is arguably a complicated task. As Scapens (1990) notes, these different types are not 
clear-cut, but, instead, the use of case study methods hinges on both the nature of the research and 
the methodology of the researcher.      
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5.3 DATA COLLECTION 
 
Data on the company’s control package and potential ambidexterity were collected from a range of 
sources. Firstly, these included eight interviews at different levels of the organisation. That is to say, 
four of the interviews took place with four members of Tekla’s senior management team (level 1) 
and the other four with members of both business units’ middle management (level 2). Secondly, a 
number of internal company documents were supplied by the CFO of the company. Finally, there 
were several business press reports and annual company reports available to the researcher. It is of 
importance to note that these various sources of evidence were used to provide multiple measures of 
the same issue (triangulation), rather than simply being used as mixed methods of data collection. 
Moreover, triangulation was sought by collecting multiple data points at different levels of the 
organisation. 
 
Analysis and interpretation of the data was an iterative process, which fairly frequently involved 
collecting additional material in order to fine tune ideas and corroborate explanations. This was done 
to ensure, as far as possible, ‘that the patterns adequately represent the observed world and are not 
merely a product of [the researcher’s] imagination’ (Ahrens and Dent, 1998, p. 9). Once the analysis 
was completed, findings were fed back to the interviewees for review in order to ascertain the 
veracity of the researcher’s understanding of various issues. 
 
5.3.1 Interviews 
 
Eight interviews, altogether twelve hours long, were conducted during the spring of 2009 (see 
Appendix D). These eight interviewees spanned two hierarchical levels within the company (levels 
1-2). For each business area (B&C and I&E), three interviews were conducted. These included: 
Executive Vice President, Director responsible for B&C business area (EVP, B&C), Senior Vice 
President, Director responsible for I&E business area (SVP, I&E) as well as two Segment Directors 
(SD 1 and SD 2) for both business units. Furthermore, it was regarded as fruitful and necessary to 
hold discussions with both Tekla’s CFO and Vice President, Director responsible for Human 
Resources (VP, HR) along with the business unit directors. Each of the interviews were recorded and 
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transcribed on a verbatim basis in order to enable not only a more thorough analysis but also a use of 
direct quotations through which the case study is likely to gain more credibility. 
 
The underlying purpose of the interviews was to meet the main subjects of the research and to 
observe the control mechanisms in order to ascertain the extent to which each control system 
contributed to the overall package of controls. The purpose was also to gain insight into the 
functionality of the control package as well as into the influence of the package configuration(s) on 
organisational ambidexterity. Interviews were hence of a semi-structured nature. This allowed the 
meetings to be guided by the beliefs and perceptions of respondents, as well as permitting factual 
information about the various control mechanisms to be obtained. Interviews of this nature also 
enabled the researcher to obtain further insight into the history, content and culture of the 
organisation. The agenda of the interviews included the following: 
  
° The process and nature of both long-range and action planning. 
° The design and use of cybernetic control systems. 
° How employees and the interviewees themselves were evaluated and rewarded, and how they 
felt about this. 
° The organisation and governance structure of the company, allocation of the decision rights 
within the company as well as the use and nature of policies and procedures. 
° The significance of organisational values and culture as well as the existence and use of 
vision and mission statements. 
° The potential existence of exploration and exploitation (i.e. ambidextrous orientation). 
° The potential existence of structural ambidexterity as well as contextual ambidexterity, i.e. 
the functionality of management control systems packages.  
 
In retrospect, the interviews were successful in shedding light on the desired information. Each 
individual interview provided a partial perspective regarding the many issues of interest, and in total, 
they gave a rich picture of the package of controls operating within the company. Furthermore, 
interviews identified differences among directors in their use of the company’s various control 
mechanisms and their perceptions as to the efficacy of these mechanisms.   
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5.3.2 Intra-Organisational and Other Documents 
 
The researcher was provided with several intra-organisational documents. These encompassed more 
specific illustrations of business areas’ organisational structures, a number of documents elaborating 
on strategic issues (such as Tekla corporate model, corporate strategy management process, strategy 
framework, and strategy and business planning cycle). In addition, a detailed slideshow about the 
control and management practices of I&E was made available. Moreover, during the interviews 
some of the respondents supported their answers by showing documents addressing balanced 
scorecards and company-wide policies and procedures. 
 
In respect of external documents, the researcher benefited from the information made available 
through the company’s website. Specifically, the annual reports of the company as well as a financial 
analysis tool available on the website proved useful during the research process. Both the internal 
and external documentation provided additional information on the issues of interest. Indeed, they 
provided the researcher with multiple measures of the same issue (triangulation) and were of 
assistance in fine-tuning ideas and corroborating explanations that emerged from the interviews.  
 
5.3.3 Measurement and Validation of Constructs 
 
This thesis endeavoured to measure three distinct theoretical concepts. First, the MCSP operating in 
the case company was operationalised on the basis of the MCSP typology proposed by Malmi & 
Brown (2008). Since Malmi & Brown (2008) do not provide any explanation how different package 
elements should be operationalised and measured, a draft of interview questions addressing all MSC 
within the package was created based on a questionnaire provided by Bedford (2006). In order to 
ascertain the relevance and appropriateness of the questions, they were reviewed and commented by 
two scholars, both highly experienced with both the theoretical and pragmatic issues of management 
control systems and their operation as a package. In effect, these academics are the persons 
responsible for the larger research project to which this study is subordinate. Therefore, this study 
considerably benefited from the contribution of these two academics. 
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Second, contextual ambidexterity, i.e. functionality of an MCSP12, was measured through a six-item 
measure provided by Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004). The interviewees were asked to indicate the 
degree (a 7-point scale) to which they agreed with the items presented in Appendix E. However, a 
minor alteration was made to the measure. In keeping with the core terminology of this thesis, it was 
regarded appropriate to replace the expression “management systems” with the expression 
“management control systems”.  
 
Finally, this study captured the ambidextrous orientation by exploiting the 12-item measure provided 
by Lubatkin et al (2006). As with the previous measure, respondents were asked to assess their firm’s 
orientation using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). However, 
the measure was slightly modified to better meet the demands of the current study. Both the original 
and altered versions of the measure are presented in Appendix F. The results were interpreted in the 
light of Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004), i.e. the company was considered as moderately ambidextrous 
if it got an ambidextrous rating above 4.00 and highly ambidextrous if it got an ambidextrous rating 
above 4.50. The ambidextrous rating was computed by adding all exploitation and exploration items 
together and dividing the sum by the number of items. The constructs measuring both contextual 
ambidexterity and ambidextrous orientation were also reviewed and approved by the 
abovementioned two academics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
12 Of note is that the measure provided by Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) was used beyond its original purpose of measuring contextual 
ambidexterity. This was due primarily to the fact that the measure provides essential information on the functionality of an MCSP. 
Consequently, this measure was used for two purposes in this study. 
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6. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY 
 
This section presents the results of the comparative case study. First, the studied and interpreted 
MCSP configurations will be briefly presented. In the second and third section, the observed MCSPs 
will be analysed vis-á-vis each other by paying particular attention to the similarities and differences 
between them. The fourth section describes how respondents perceived the functionality of the 
MCSPs operating within the business units and, finally, the fifth section addresses Tekla’s 
organisational ambidexterity and its antecedents.  
 
6.1 MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS PACKAGES OF B&C AND I&E 
 
Drawing on the framework provided by Malmi & Brown (2008) this study endeavoured to uncover 
the configurations of control packages operating in the researched business units. Moreover, the 
researcher aimed at getting an appreciation of the interplay between the different MCS within the 
packages. As a result, two distinct MCSP illustrations were drawn in a fashion that seeks to capture 
both the significance and interrelatedness of the package elements (Figures 4 and 5 below).  
 
Figure 4. Management Control Systems Package of B&C 
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The MCSP of B&C is illustrated in Figure 4. Of important note is that both the size and location of 
different control elements have a specific meaning in the figure. Indeed, the figure illustrates how (1) 
cultural controls are embedded in most of the other package elements, (2) planning controls and 
cybernetic controls overlap with each other and are linked to administrative controls, (3) and how 
reward and compensation controls are partially independent from other package elements (especially 
from cybernetic controls). Furthermore, the figure depicts (4) the emphasised role of planning, 
cybernetic and administrative controls, (5) a less important role of reward and compensations 
controls, and (6) an underlying but influencing role of cultural controls. 
 
Figure 5. Management Control Systems Package of I&E 
 
 
 
The MCSP of I&E is illustrated in Figure 5. Similarly, both the size and location of different control 
elements seek to illustrate the importance and interrelatedness of the package elements. Also the 
MCSP of I&E portrays how (1) cultural controls are embedded in most of the other package 
elements, (2) planning controls and cybernetic controls overlap with each other and are linked to 
administrative controls, and (3) how reward and compensation controls are partially independent 
from other package elements. What seems to be different is (4) the less important role of 
administrative controls in directing employee behaviour. Also, (5) both planning and cybernetic 
controls appear to play a slightly more important role in respect of I&E’s control package. As with 
the MCSP of B&C, (6) reward and compensations controls can be argued to have a less significant 
role and (7) cultural controls an underlying but influencing role in the MCSP of I&E. Of important 
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note is that the cultural controls cover the whole MCSP of I&E, whereas a part of the administrative 
controls in B&C’s control package are not influenced by cultural controls. 
 
The following two sections elaborate on the similarities and differences of these MCSPs, 
respectively. Notwithstanding this broad categorisation, there are, however, both similarities and 
differences between the business units in how they use various package elements. Therefore, the 
main thrust here is to label package elements as “similar” between the business units if they are 
argued to be more similar than they are different and, on the other hand, as “different” if they are 
argued to be more different than they are similar.  It will be asserted below that the planning, 
cybernetic, reward and compensation, and cultural controls operate in a considerably similar fashion 
in both business units. Hence, the administrative controls constitute the main difference between the 
two packages.  
 
6.2 SIMILARITIES OF MCSPS BETWEEN B&C AND I&E 
 
6.2.1 Planning Controls 
 
Strategic planning of both B&C and I&E follows the general strategic planning cycle governed by 
the board of directors. Figure 6 depicts both the elements and timetable of the planning process. In 
terms of schedule, the strategy work of Tekla and its business areas takes place in early spring, after 
which the strategy is approved by the board of directors in June, followed by a strategic action 
planning after the summer and an annual planning in the fourth quarter. The duration of the strategic 
cycle has been set at three years but the three-year strategy is, however, reviewed on a yearly basis.   
 
As it can be seen from the Figures 4, 5 and 6, both business units use BSC more as a planning device 
than in its traditional role as a strategic performance measurement system. This was succinctly put by 
the Segment Director 2 (I&E) who said that “action plan equals balanced scorecard, it is the tool for 
action planning”. Moreover, the same Segment Director felt that ‘the creation process of it [BSC] is 
relatively heavy in relation to the management of the operative business’, which suggests that the 
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emphasis of BSC is placed more on the planning and less on the performance management aspect of 
BSC. Also, though it is not to say that the BSC should be operated through a specifically designed IT 
solution, the way in which the BSC is administered in practice in both business units, i.e. through 
PowerPoint, to a certain degree lends support to the above interpretation.  
 
Figure 6. Tekla Planning Cycle: Strategy 
 
 
 
Moreover, the Figure 4 and 5 illustrate that budgeting, or rolling forecasting, is used less as a 
planning device and more as a cybernetic control system at the business area level. In respect of 
B&C, this can be due partially to the strong growth the unit has reached in the previous years, which 
has made forecasting particularly complicated. Also, the budgetary planning process and target 
setting is the primary planning tool at the corporate level, whereas business areas concentrate on 
planning the activities that are required in order for the business units to attain the desired ends. The 
Segment Director 1 (I&E) explained as follows: ‘The strategy is bound by the budget. It starts to 
direct behaviour at the board, management and business area level and then we need to think how to 
generate those euros’. More evidence corroborating the suggested view and use of these control 
systems will be provided in the cybernetic controls section. 
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Strategy work of both business areas is relatively strongly influenced by the board of directors. 
However, the highest level strategy work is conducted in a cooperative and discussing manner 
between the board and the management team. The Executive Vice President responsible for B&C 
explained as follows: ’...we have a relatively clear process, the board of directors guides at the 
corporate level. The board of directors considers the level of growth, investments and risk... It works 
quite well as a sparring mirror. We have a fairly strong board, which has good experience from our 
business, and they provide us with sparring.’ A similar view was provided by the CFO of Tekla who 
stated: ‘The leaders of the business areas present the strategy of their own business areas to the 
board, and in that context a sparring and discussion take place between the board and management 
team whether the strategy is in the right ballpark and if the objectives are a) realistic and b) 
adequately challenging, and whether the focuses and intents set by the board are reflected in the 
strategy.’ 
 
The cooperative and discussing way of planning can also be identified at the lower organisational 
levels, where the planning comprises the formulation of both long-term and short-term BSCs. 
Specifically, all respondents expressed the all-encompassing nature of planning which involves 
virtually every organisational participant. However, a major exception of this is the area organisation 
of B&C, of which only the largest area and the largest partner contribute to the planning process. The 
following comment by the Segment Director 2 (B&C) demonstrates the role of this participative 
planning: ‘I think it [balanced scorecard] is strongly directive because it is participative at all levels. 
It is not just something that is created somewhere and then it would not be used for anything. 
Personally, I perceive it in an extremely strong way that it is very forcefully directive just because it 
has not been created in a dark room or somewhere far so that it would then be such an external tool. 
Rather, everyone has contributed to it and exerts effort.’ 
 
The participative nature of planning was also evident in the I&E unit as comments such as ‘...this is 
such a small team. And they participate in everything, together we think and ponder.’ (SD 1, I&E) 
and ‘...at the segment level very robustly. The strategy and action plan of I&E are done for the most 
part by the management team, I mean the management team of I&E, but from that onwards we do it 
together’ (SD 2, I&E) illustrate. Moreover, the researcher was provided with a document elaborating 
on the management and control of the I&E business area. According to this document, the strategy is 
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created by the management team of I&E, but the evaluation of the business area’s strategy is 
conducted by the whole unit and finally approved by Tekla’s management team and board of 
directors. A planning process of this kind can be argued to be effective in direction of employee 
behaviour since participation and influence in strategy work is likely to increase commitment and 
therefore action (Bukh & Malmi, 2005). 
 
Respondents were unanimous in their perception of the interrelatedness of long-range and short-term 
planning. For instance, a comment such as ‘we have a three-year horizon... and it is reflected in 
budgets and action plans. From all of these we depress the key actions for 2009... And when we have 
nailed them down at the year level we then depress them to quarters in the form of an action plan’ 
(EVP, B&C) suggests that the planning process is done by linking the different elements of planning 
to each other in a consistent fashion. Indeed, throughout the interviews a view came across that the 
previous stage of the planning process acts as the basis for the next stage. According to Bukh & 
Malmi (2005), it is more likely that the behaviour of the employees are consistent with the objectives 
and strategies of the firm if they understand how their actions are related to more broad objectives of 
the firm.  
 
The Segment Director 2 (I&E) clarified the interrelatedness as follows: ‘It [strategic planning] is 
sort of a basis when we do action planning, which is the balanced scorecard. There is always a link 
how this is related to the strategy. This way we seek to ascertain also the fact that all strategic issues 
will be included in the action plan of the unit.’ Also, the Senior Vice President responsible for I&E 
explained the link between the strategic planning and short-term planning in a similar fashion: ‘The 
structure of our strategy is such that there are vision elements, first comes this introduction and then 
there are six vision elements. Each vision element is corresponded by certain strategic objectives 
and actions. And they are relatively high level strategic objectives and actions, but they strongly 
direct this annual level action planning.’    
 
In respect of strategic objectives, the financial ones seem to dominate – at least in terms of 
measurability and specificity. Comments such as ‘They [strategic objectives] often culminate in 
money. Targets are described through money’ (CFO), ‘it is relatively challenging to set measurable 
targets, other than numerical... I would say that most of those [other than numerical strategic] 
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objectives remain at sort of a gut feeling level and to be said, whether this has progressed to the 
desired direction’ (SD 1, B&C), and ‘financials, profit and so on are fairly accurate... Then the 
others are more like this, their measurability is not as accurate’ (SD 2, B&C) point to the fact that 
all but the financial strategic objectives are not highly explicit at the corporate or business unit level.  
 
Also, the respondents working at the I&E business unit commented on the strategic objectives that 
‘more and more the challenge is the measurability, how to get right information that can be 
measured and followed that they have become materialised... we have a couple of clear strategic 
objectives... those can be measured in terms of revenue’ (SD 1,  I&E),  ‘there are revenue targets, 
profitability targets, certain market targets, that we achieve something new (SD 2, I&E), and 
‘Strategic objectives are not measured on the three-year perspective and we have not even tried to 
measure...  No measurable objectives  are set  there -  quite  the contrary,  it  is  an issue of  the yearly  
action plan. That is, the annual plan, the action plan needs to implement the strategy’ (SVP, I&E). 
Despite the lack of other than financial strategic objectives, it was emphasised in both business units 
that the precision and measurability of these objectives increase as the strategy is cascaded down 
through BSCs. 
 
An essential part of the strategy work that is not included in the Figure 6, are the mission and vision 
statements. In B&C they are extensively used and communicated to employees ‘in order for them to 
have an understanding of the core – what we do and why we do’ (EVP, B&C) and ‘to reinforce the 
company’s way of working and culture, and persistency in order to deliver the same message all the 
time’ (SD 2, B&C). Furthermore, especially the vision statement and vision elements can be argued 
to play a role in B&C since they are the basis upon which the strategy work and BSCs are built.  
 
On the other hand, comments such as ‘They [mission and vision statements] are a bit long... I hardly 
can remember what they are’ (SD  1,  I&E)  and  ‘in a way our vision and mission are sort of, 
especially in our unit but also at the Tekla level, I can’t even remember them just like that even if I 
tried to mug them up to my head’ (SD 2, I&E) suggest that the mission and vision statements of I&E 
are likely to play a less significant role than it was argued in connection with the B&C. The Senior 
Vice President responsible for I&E confirmed that the mission statement is not actively used but, 
however, claimed that the vision statement is used and depicted through certain vision elements in 
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order to make it adequately concrete. Therefore, the business units seem to differ in the degree to 
which they use vision and mission statements as a part of their package of controls.    
 
Taken together, the planning process of the both business units as a whole appears coherent and 
requires a considerable amount of management time. The strategic planning is done in an all-
encompassing and participative way especially in the headquarters. The planning process of B&C 
partially excludes the area organisation from the strategy work. However, as the process advances 
the area organisation is more involved in the planning process. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
strategic planning along with action and annual planning constitute an essential part of the MCSP 
which directs employee behaviour within both the B&C and I&E units.  
 
6.2.2 Cybernetic Controls 
 
There are two distinct cybernetic control systems operating in both business areas. First, the rolling 
forecasting is a system that spans through the whole organisation. The CFO explained the system in 
the following way: ‘A couple of years ago we have tried to get rid of the so called heavy budgeting. 
We refer it to as annual planning, which is updated with forecasts quarterly on a rolling basis... 
budgeting is taken to the level, where every company and every subsidiary abroad budget. Also the 
business areas budget and there it is taken to the level of an individual sphere of responsibility – we 
refer it to as cost centre level.’ The operation of the rolling forecasting as a cybernetic control system 
stems from five specific characteristics (based on Green & Welsh, 1988): (1) Tekla uses it in order to 
quantify the underlying activity, (2) it sets and updates the standards of performance and targets to be 
met in different organisational units, (3) various kinds of management teams, councils and area 
navigations form a feedback process that enables comparison of the outcome of the activities with 
the standard, (4) these different forums also enable variance analysis arising from the feedback, and 
(5) the interviewees claimed that they actively react to the results of the variance analysis and modify 
the underlying activities if necessary. 
 
As it was noted in the foregoing, the annual planning, or rolling forecasting, plays a key role in the 
management of operative business, rather than as a tool for planning process at the business unit 
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level. On the other hand, it was argued that the BSC is merely used as a tool for planning. Therefore, 
the rolling forecasting seems to represent the major cybernetic control system operating in the 
business units. The Senior Vice President responsible for I&E perceived the rolling forecasting as 
particularly functional as the following comment illustrates: ‘...we have the right forecasting process. 
We forecast financially, revenue forecasting, cost forecasting, profit forecasting, for me it is a 
splendid tool for managing business. And previously we did not have that at all, it was just a gut 
feeling where this is going. Now we get facts and when we take farther and farther the view under 
our scrutiny, it has been, if the operative profitability is considered, by far the best control system.‘ 
 
When asked whether either of the cybernetic control systems plays a more significant role in the 
management of the business area, the Segment Directors 1 and 2 (I&E) commented: ‘They both have 
a role and the financial figures have a more forceful role’ and ‘In my opinion sales, in which I have 
a background myself, it is more the budgetary-based follow-up’.  Also,  irrespective  of  the  
complicated forecasting environment of the B&C business unit, also the interviewees from that unit 
perceived the budgetary control as more important of the two cybernetic control systems. This is well 
captured by the Segment Director 1 (B&C) who stated: ‘I don’t feel that I control those areas 
through balanced scorecards... I say, the areas are very much controlled by financials, there is a 
profit contribution measure for them and they need to generate that figure and it certainly directs. 
Those are profit centres and profit contribution directs all of them at the end of the day... At the B&C 
level the most effective controls are the financial targets. There is the budget and this financial, that 
is what I feel controls the areas most at the B&C level.’ 
 
Furthermore, the CFO commented on the most effective control system as follows: ‘If we talk about 
the short-term control mechanisms, not about the strategic cycle, then unfortunately they are the 
plans towards which we reflect. They are the most effective tool in our case’. Therefore, it seems that 
budgeting, i.e. rolling forecasting plays a key role in both business units when it comes to the 
direction of employee behaviour and the management of operative business. 
 
Second, both business units use the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), which, in its initial role as a strategic 
management system, endeavours to translate vision and strategy of a business unit into objectives 
and performance measures in four distinct areas: the financial, customer, internal-business-process, 
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and learning and growth perspectives (Kaplan & Norton, 1996b). Malmi (2001) argues that for a 
measurement system to be a BSC it should contain financial and non-financial measures, these 
measures should be derived from strategy and the measurement framework should contain 
perspectives derived from the original four. In addition, Malmi (2001) argues that a BSC can be 
applied in two distinct fashions. First, it can be used in a “management by objectives” manner, 
which,  inter  alia,  involves  target  setting  for  BSC  measures.  Second,  it  can  act  rather  as  an  
information system than a steering device.  
 
The BSCs operating in the business units do to meet the above criteria. The BSCs comprise both 
financial and non-financial measures, and they appear to be derived from the strategy (see the above 
arguments in respect of planning controls), but the perspectives are, to a degree, not clearly derived 
from the original four. Whilst the BSCs of I&E include the original four perspectives, as the Segment 
Director 1 (I&E) explained: ‘financial, then we have the customer perspective, internal operations, 
how it works, and then the competence and the growth of learning’, in the B&C unit the selected 
perspectives are different, as can be noted from the following comment: ‘Then we looked at the 
balanced scorecard through four areas. Let’s take competitiveness, innovation ability. Then let’s 
take our actions and standards, like processes, customer value, and just numerical figures’ (SD 1,  
B&C).    
 
Comments such as ‘We seek to define a measure for every [BSC item], but we easily might end up 
having a measure, that we measure how revenue has developed’ (SD 1, I&E), ‘The measuring of 
strategy clearly through a measure that everyone understands... it is more like a guideline at the 
moment. The financial measures are very clear, then there are more like guidelines and subjects’ 
(SD 2, B&C), ‘There [in the BSC] are a lot of such that is not easily measurable. I mean measurable 
in a way that [the items] would have a figure or schedule or such’ (EVP, B&C), ‘Is it necessary to 
measure everything? Euros are easy to measure and certain facts, but those more vague issues might 
be a bit hard to measure and to follow as well’ (SD 2, I&E) suggest that not every BSC item has a 
measure and a target. In addition, the follow-up of BSCs is done on a quarterly basis and, as it was 
noted above, budgeting plays a more important role in these follow-up sessions. Furthermore, the 
BSCs do not encompass targets for individual employees, but objectives that are shared between 
other subunit employees. Finally, the Senior Vice President responsible for I&E explained the role of 
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BSCs as follows: ‘Perhaps the challenge of the action plan is a bit the fact that it tends to be 
development-oriented. There are development issues of operations and hence we do not go through it 
in these monthly meetings, we concentrate on them once in a quarter’. 
 
Since some of the BSC items do not necessarily have a measure, target or both, the tool is hardly 
used in a “management by objectives” manner. For the same reasons, hardly are they used as an 
information system. Thus, the described BSC of both B&C and I&E cannot be categorised according 
to Malmi’s (2001) classification. Instead, in light of the above evidence, it can be argued that the 
BSCs are used merely as a planning tool in both business units. 
 
However, as it was suggested in the foregoing, in its role as a planning tool the BSC seems to work 
relatively well. Though the BSCs of the business units cannot be regarded as BSCs in their original 
meaning, the contention of Kaplan & Norton (1996b) that the BSC provides a number of 
mechanisms for linking long-term objectives with short-term actions appears to be valid. Indeed, the 
development of the BSC in a participative and all-encompassing fashion forces the managers to 
develop a consensus around the business area’s strategy, and allows the strategy to be communicated 
throughout the organisation. This communication is said to be of assistance in ensuring that 
employees understand the long-term strategy, the relations among the various strategic objectives, 
and the association between the employees’ actions and the chosen strategic goals (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996b).  
 
This view is supported by Bukh & Malmi (2005), who assert that the involvement of subunit 
managers in creating business unit level strategy and, to a certain extent, the freedom to come up 
with means by which to contribute to the higher level objectives, are a prerequisite for a BSC and 
associated strategies to translate into action. In respect of Tekla, the interviews strongly indicated 
that employees (not only managers) not only fully contribute to the development of means by which 
to attain strategic goals, but also partially have a say in choosing the strategic targets. It can be 
regarded as important that such a dialogue takes place between the employees working at different 
organisational levels, since “this may contribute to bridging differences of perception and 
understanding so that goal congruence increases” (Nørreklit, 2000, p. 83).  
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Taken together, the budgeting (i.e. rolling forecasting) can be argued to play a more significant role 
as a cybernetic control system than the BSC in the management and control of the business areas. 
Secondly, the BSCs operating in the business units do not fully serve the purpose of a strategic 
performance measurement system, but are of significant assistance in the planning process.  In effect, 
the BSCs described above resemble more the French tableau de bord than the original BSC 
introduced by Kaplan & Norton. This is due mainly to four specific factors (based on Bourguignon et 
al, 2004). First, there is room for negotiation and dialogue in the creation process of tableau de bord, 
as opposed to the top-down approach emphasised in respect of the BSC. Second, whilst the rewards 
are not based on performance with regards to tableau de bord, Kaplan and Norton (1996a, 1996b) 
argue that the reward systems should sooner or later be linked to scorecard measures13. Third, 
discussion is considered more important than implementation in respect of tableau de bord. Fourth, 
the tableau de bord does not explicitly rely on any specific strategic model and areas of 
measurements but on managers’ conception of strategy, whereas the BSC is more a tool with 
predetermined categories. 
 
6.2.3 Reward and Compensation Controls 
 
Tekla’s incentive plans are two-fold. On the one hand, there is a bonus pool arrangement covering 
multiple individuals across the firm and, on the other hand, a provision system for employees 
engaged in sales activities14. Of particular note is that the system is corporation-wide and, hence, is 
applied in both business units in a similar fashion. The bonus pool arrangement has the following 
features: (1) the method of determining the total amount of bonus pool is based on an explicit 
formula (involving accounting earnings and share price development), (2) the total amount of bonus 
pool is, however, not agreed-upon ex ante, but rather is left to the discretion of the board of directors, 
(3) the manner in which the bonus pool is allocated among the covered individuals hinges on the 
subjective performance evaluation of immediate supervisors.  
 
                                                  
13 Even though this will be explained in more detail in the next section, it can be noted that the reward system is not linked to scorecard 
measures in the business units. 
14 These people include sales personnel and consultants who take care of the “repatriation of sales”. These consultants are entitled to a 
fraction of the net sales budgets, but are not rewarded on the basis of sales budgets. 
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The CFO elaborated on the bonus pool arrangement as follows: ‘...some years ago Tekla had a very 
detailed KPI system... In a sense it was problematic that the company incurred losses, but anyway 
quite different bonuses were paid on the basis of these KPI realisations. At that stage the system was 
taken to the other side... In a way it is considered what sort of starting and target level for the 
development of the share price is appropriate and then there are certain general upper level 
formulae. According to these measures it is calculated whether a distributable bonus pool is accrued 
and once the net profit for the period and other information have been revealed the board decides 
that the bonus pool for the previous financial year is X or Y. Taking, however, into account, that the 
decisions can be deviated from... Then it starts to cascade down. The board decides the first and the 
roughest apportionment of how much of the pool is given to the business areas and how much to the 
support functions.’ 
 
By and large the described bonus system was perceived as having its pros and cons. First, the new 
system was believed to tackle the major problem of the previous KPI-based system, which suffered 
from the fact that KPIs agreed on a year in advance tend to dramatically change within that year and, 
therefore, are likely to lose their relevance. In addition, the Executive Vice President responsible for 
B&C felt that the KPI system, to some degree, led to sub-optimisation as some employees engaged 
in gaming activities. In the current system, the targets and the basis on which the employees are 
rewarded can be altered during the rewarding period due to the subjective performance evaluation 
conducted by immediate supervisors. 
 
On the other hand, the problem of the current system was described as follows: ‘What are the 
drawbacks then? That is the unforeseeability. When the pay-for-performance is distributed after the 
operational year based on a mechanistic system, where there is an element, let’s say the share price 
development, which is completely independent of the individual that is rewarded’ (SVP, I&E), ‘if I 
do a good job and the company does well, it will be shown in my bonus, but there is no guarantee 
and promise of it’ (CFO), and ‘Now my people might do an excellent job in 2009, but as the 
environment is what it is, the result to be distributed next year, if the economy won’t change, is 
absolutely less than have been distributed on the basis of the previous years’ (EVP, B&C). In 
addition, an issue that was not mentioned during the interviews is the argument that such a 
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corporation-wide bonus scheme might induce free-rider problems since employees bear the full cost 
of exerting extra effort but receive only a fraction of the benefits (Brickley et al, 2007).  
 
Also, the subjective performance evaluation has both its advantages and drawbacks. First, the major 
advantage of the subjective approach is that it allows an employee’s performance to be evaluated on 
a more comprehensive basis, since the aspects of job that are measured less easily can also be 
considered (Brickley et al, 2007). For example, Baiman and Rajan (1995) show that discretionary 
bonus schemes, in which an objectively-determined bonus pool is allocated to managers based on 
subjective evaluations of the managers' performance, enable the owner to use non-contractible 
information such as non-quantifiable or "soft" measures (e.g. the principal's personal observations of 
the manager's ability or effort level) to achieve an optimal improvement in managerial effort.  
 
According to Brickley et al (2007), there are four potential problems with subjective performance 
evaluation: (1) shirking among supervisors, (2) forced distribution, (3) influence costs, and (4) 
reneging. In other words, supervisors may shirk on performance evaluations, for instance, by rating 
all employees about the same, overstating the poor performers, compressing ratings around some 
norm rather than disentangling good performers from bad performers, or ranking employees based 
on personal likes and dislikes. Forced distribution refers to an allotment where a fixed fraction of 
employees is assigned to specific categories. This can also lead to inaccuracies – especially if applied 
to small groups. Influence costs include those unproductive activities employees engage in in order 
to influence outcomes (such as politicking for higher ratings by their supervisors). Reneging refers to 
the potential that a firm will break a promise to reward superior performance, since the subjective 
measures are not verifiable. 
 
Comments such as ‘We seek first not to distribute equally, not to distribute 2000 per person, there 
have to be differences in performance, why that one got more and that one less. Another one is not to 
distribute 10 000 to one and zero to others’ (CFO) and ‘Of  course  we  need  to  aim  at  justice.  If  a  
business area makes a zero profit and there are money to be distributed, the persons responsible 
won’t get anything, but the other people should get something if they have done their work well and 
right’ (VP, HR) suggest that the management of Tekla acknowledges the problems inherent to the 
current bonus system. Irrespective of the management team’s intention to avoid these problems, the 
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interviews, however, revealed that some of the described problems might be present in the business 
units. While there was no indication of neither influence activities nor reneging on promises, the 
freedom given to the supervisors to conduct the subjective performance evaluation as they see 
appropriate, might induce shirking and forced distributions.  
 
Specifically, a number of methods of subjective performance evaluation were explained during the 
interviews. Some supervisors tend to base their evaluation on the BSCs and the set targets and some 
claimed to rely on a guidance document provided by the HR department of Tekla. Comments such as 
‘There are no such persons who would not do things and would try to shirk or something. Therefore, 
I don’t face such situations that whether that person is more valuable than this one, because we 
cooperate extremely much and make results as a team, and then the basis is whether we have 
reached the results as a team, and then they [rewards] are distributed to everyone’ (SD 2, B&C), 
and ‘standard minus and standard plus were the means by which I aimed at getting a perspective 
how it goes. And then I considered myself, whether performance is at standard, standard plus or 
standard minus... these would imply a five-week salary, and the standard would imply, let’s say, a 
four-week salary, and standard minus implies a three-week salary’ (SD 1, B&C) can be regarded as 
indications of a sort of shirking and forced distribution, respectively. Therefore, the effectiveness of 
such a bonus scheme can at least be questioned. 
 
Since there is a wide array of means how the subjective performance evaluations are conducted in 
the business areas, the link between the bonus scheme and other control package elements seems 
weak. That is, even though some supervisors may base their evaluations on BSCs, organisational 
values or on a corporation-wide guidance document, there is not such a systematic way in place that 
would form an explicit link to other controls. The provision system, on the other hand, is heavily 
based on budgeted sales and net sales, and is therefore tightly linked to cybernetic controls. In total, 
it seems that the reward and compensation controls are only partially linked to other controls within 
the business areas’ MCSPs.    
 
In terms of the steering and motivational effects of these reward and compensation systems, the 
provision system of sales people was perceived as very effective whereas the bonus scheme was not. 
One reason for the provision system, which is based on both personal and team level sales and net 
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sales budgets, to be regarded as effective might be the additional incentives included in the system. 
That  is  to  say,  if  the target  level  is  exceeded the “slope” increases  in  proportion,  which ‘results in 
better and better rewarding’ (SD 2, I&E). In addition, as the sales people are also entitled to a 
fraction of the attainment of segment and business unit level sales targets, the system encourages co-
operation among employees engaged in sales activities.  
 
On the contrary, comments such as ‘It [rewarding system] is our Achilles heel’ (EVP, B&C), ‘but 
then again, it [reward system] is not the primary steering device, though maybe it should not be said 
aloud’ (SVP, I&E), ‘according to the personnel survey it [the bonus scheme] is not perceived as 
adequately motivative’ (VP,  HR),  and ‘I don’t feel that very much... the steering effect is not very 
strong, I think’ (SD 1, B&C) suggest that the bonus scheme does not play a key role in steering and 
motivating employees. The steering and motivational effects can further be questioned since the 
classification between the sales people and others seems to be open to interpretations. The following 
comment by the Segment Director 1 (I&E) illustrates this potential drawback: ‘There [in support 
functions] are individuals who support and feel that they support sales forcefully - that is true. There 
might be people who think that they should be entitled to a part of this [sales provision], and they are 
probably right about it, but the limits go somewhere.’ 
 
It should be noted that the reward and compensation controls may also come in forms other than 
monetary. The Director responsible for Human Resources (HR) claimed that, according to the 
personnel satisfaction survey, a wide array of fringe benefits, common events, clubs and other 
activities among employees, competitive base salary as well as the flexibility that Tekla offers are 
highly appreciated among employees. Hence, it seems that the other forms of rewarding hardly 
provide major incentives but, on the other hand, do not cause demotivational effects.   
 
Taken together, it seems that the reward and compensation controls are only partially linked to other 
control package elements. This lends support to the argument of Malmi & Brown (2008) who state 
that these controls might also be used for other reasons than achieving congruence between the goals 
and activities of employees and those of the organisation. In effect, it seems that the reward and 
compensation controls of Tekla, except for the provision system of sales people, do not play a key 
role in steering and motivating employees. Instead, it can be argued that they provide employees 
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with a sufficient level of compensation, which attracts and assists in retaining qualified employees 
without providing significant incentives. This view was succinctly captured by the Segment Director 
1 (B&C), who stated: ‘Does money motivate? I don’t feel it is a very strong motivator at that point, 
but the lack of money is a demotivator. I consider it rather that way. If you get a good bonus and 
your salary is reasonable, you won’t feel demotivated’.   
 
6.2.4 Cultural Controls 
 
Tekla has four common values: (1) professional expert, (2) committed partner, (3) innovative 
pioneer, and (4) successful team. These values are the result of a participative value work and 
discussion which was conducted by the whole personnel in 2003 when a new CEO started to work 
for the company. The employees were expected to contribute to the discussion both before and after 
the values were decided. According to the Vice President (HR), this participative value discussion 
launched by the new CEO was an attempt to find something common for the two relatively distinct 
business units and to concurrently assess whether the old values from the 1990s were still valid. 
 
The respondents were able to give many illustrations how the values are present in the organisation. 
As the following comments demonstrate, some felt that the values are relatively often referred to: I 
feel, that they [values] are quite often talked about here’ (VP, HR), ‘they [values] are referred to, 
even in conversations, which is quite exciting. They are quite deep especially in Espoo [the 
headquarters], and many refer to them at meetings’ (SD 2, B&C). The Segment Director 1 (B&C) 
even claimed to have used the values as ‘a tool of directing and management’ when considering 
between decision-making alternatives and guiding subordinates. In addition, the respondents 
described how values are present in the strategy work, target setting, subjective performance 
evaluation, and in the recruitment process. An essential part of the recruitment process at Tekla is 
formed by an aptitude test. Tekla has used the same tester for ten years, who ‘knows exactly... how 
well the new persons will adapt to our culture and to our organisation’ (VP, HR).    
 
However, while the interviewees claimed that the values are present and the behaviour of employees 
is in compliance with these values, none of them perceived them as a strong steering device. 
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Comments such as ‘somehow I feel that they are not actively pushed... But then indirectly it, 
however, people have in a certain way internalised them and they act according to them. In that way 
they are the right values for Tekla’ (SD 1, B&C), ‘the manner in which we work, it has adhered to 
everyone. How well they perceive that it came exactly from that value, that is a different thing, but 
the way in which we work and do things, that is very well instilled in the organisation (EVP, B&C), 
‘they [values] just represent what we do’ (SD 1,  I&E),  and ‘the general feedback is that we act in 
accordance with our values and they are shown in our operations... but, nevertheless, I don’t think 
they are a very steering matter’ (CFO) suggest that the values are not actively used as a steering 
device, but still they are shown in day-to-day actions. This might be due to a strong organisational 
culture that is deeply embedded in the organisation. The following comment by the Senior Vice 
President responsible for I&E lends support to this interpretation: ‘Tekla has a relatively strong 
corporate culture, and I&E has a corporate culture. Perhaps the values, which were polished in that 
certain project, perhaps they are just the tip of the iceberg... There is some activeness, but it’s not on 
the lines, but it’s the company’s identity and spirit and value basis, which are much deeper than the 
values that we have polished and published.’ 
 
The deepness of the culture (and also the values) was also evident in a comment by the Segment 
Director 1 (B&C), who stated: ‘when we conducted this big process and they [values] didn’t change, 
so in that way they are reasonably deep what people think’. Also, the following comment by the 
Vice President (HR) suggests that the organisational culture has long historical roots and the values 
are a manifestation of something deeper and more influential: ‘Personally I think that the values well 
represent this company. It would be harder to imagine better values. I have been here for 25 years, 
and I have some sort of understanding of what kind of company this was in the 1980s and what it’s 
like now. Ok, of course we are more global and larger and fancier, but the basis is formed by the 
very same values that have always been appreciated here.’ 
 
Similarly, the CFO referred to a benchmark survey results and claimed: ‘what is felt here [in Tekla] 
on a stronger basis than outside in average comparisons is the fact that the Tekla spirit and the 
Tekla atmosphere are perceived as very good, which is extremely good of course’. Hence, it seems 
that Tekla’s “way we do things around here”, (i.e. the Tekla spirit, the Tekla atmosphere, Tekla’s 
organisational culture) is relatively strong and directs employee behaviour both on its own and 
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indirectly by underpinning other control package elements. The latter assertion is strongly supported 
by a comment of the CFO, who claimed that ‘the value basis goes top-down through the 
organisation; it’s embedded in all steering and planning mechanisms’. Therefore, it is argued here 
that the cultural controls are an essential part of the MCSP in both business units and they provide a 
contextual frame for other MCS within the package.   
 
Though the cultural controls are argued to operate in a similar way in both B&C and I&E, the 
organisational area that is covered by these controls is not equally wide. This is due primarily to the 
fact that the global area organisation of B&C comprises subsidiaries in a number of countries having 
considerable cultural differences. Furthermore, the Segment Director 2 (B&C) asserted that ‘a major 
effort’ is needed in order for Tekla to implement its values on a global basis. The Segment Director 1 
(B&C) explained the minor role of value-based management in respect of the area organisation as 
follows: ‘When we go to  the areas,  I  try  to  look things by way of  strategy.  This  is  such work that  
complies with the strategy, what we do, but I don’t rely on values’. Consequently, it seems that Tekla 
has not actively endeavoured to instil values in its global employees and, hence, the extent to which 
cultural controls assist in directing the behaviour of area organisation’s employees can be argued to 
be scant. 
 
6.3 DIFFERENCES OF MCSPS BETWEEN B&C AND I&E 
 
6.3.1 Administrative Controls 
 
Malmi & Brown (2008) divide administrative controls into three groups: organisation structure, 
governance structure, and policies and procedures. As a general conception, it can be noted that the 
administrative controls operating in the business units are not entirely different. The major and, as it 
will be argued, influential difference emerging is the global area organisation which mainly supports 
the business of B&C. As for both the governance structure and policies and procedures, it is argued 
that they are not completely different between the business areas, but have several similarities. These 
observations will be elaborated further below. 
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First, in respect of organisation structure, both business units rely nowadays on a matrix 
organisation, albeit I&E only as of 2009 and B&C already as of 2006. The reshaped organisation 
structure was claimed to be a respond to the inadequate support provided by the previous, function-
based, structure in fostering a customer orientation. The organisation chart of I&E is depicted in 
Figure 7. The figure illustrates that the segments and units are allocated according to two main 
processes: customer process and product development process. The three segments and two customer 
services units carry out the customer process and the four product development units are responsible 
for the product development process. Of note is that the segments are responsible for both the 
account and channel management as well as for the consultation. 
 
Figure 7. Infra & Energy Organisation Chart 
 
 
 
The organisation of B&C also encompasses industry-specific segments (albeit four instead of three) 
and  three  functions.  These  segments  include:  (1)  steel,  (2)  precast,  (3)  engineering,  and  (4)  
contractor, and the three functions comprise: (1) product development, (2) business administration, 
and (3) B&C marketing. Even though there is a slight difference between the business units with 
regard to the responsibility of channel management, which in I&E’s organisation belongs to the 
segments and in B&C’s organisation to the business administration function, the organisation 
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structures seem considerably akin to each other. This similarity is also evident in the way in which 
the decision rights are allocated within the business units as well as in the degree of hierarchy – both 
laying emphasis on an empowerment aspect. 
 
The interviewees claimed that, in most cases, the decision rights are decentralised as long as the 
decisions comply with the agreed budgets and BSCs. In respect of investment decisions, there are 
specific euro limits based on the level of hierarchy at which the decision is made (i.e. 2 000 000 for 
CEO, 300 000 for a business unit leader or a member of the management team, and 20 000 for a 
segment or unit manager). In practice, however, the decision rights are often assigned to and the 
decisions are agreed on by specific councils (explained later in the section), but comments such as ‘I 
think everybody knows what we are seeking… We don’t have such formal hierarchy that you would 
need to come and ask’ (SD 1, I&E) and ‘Pretty much people are able to and do decide on their own 
matters, because they are smart and skilful people’ (SD 2, I&E) suggest that the employees are 
relatively empowered at all hierarchical levels. 
 
The decentralisation of decision rights can be argued to accord with Tekla’s mode of operation. 
Since Tekla is engaged in portfolio management at the corporate level and the two business units are 
fairly different and, hence, the management of them requires plenty of local knowledge, it makes 
sense to leave most decisions to the business units’ discretion (Brickley et al, 2007). Decentralisation 
also enables the senior management to focus on strategic decisions and promotes the training and 
motivation of the employees to which the decision rights are assigned (Brickley et al, 2007).   
 
Also  in  terms  of  hierarchy,  the  respondents  emphasised  the  empowerment  aspect.  Indeed,  a  
maximum of four hierarchical levels can be found within the business units (business unit 
leader?segment/unit director?group manager?”shop floor”). However, in many segments and 
units there is not a group manager post, which reduces the hierarchical levels to three in many cases. 
In addition, in order for the researcher not to get a wrong appreciation, the interviewees accompanied 
their answers with comments such as ‘luckily we are small and we consider ourselves as relatively 
flexible just that we don’t have multistage hierarchies’ (CFO), ‘but it [hierarchy] is, how would I put 
it, more like administrative’ (SD 2, I&E), ‘then however, if we think of our cooperation in different 
contexts, it is very networked. More like networked or project-like is what could describe it’ (SD 2, 
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B&C) and ‘this seems a bit hierarchical, though we are however fairly dynamic at the end of the 
day’ (SD 2, I&E). 
 
Notwithstanding the apparent resemblance of organisation structures, the factor that substantially 
disentangles B&C’s matrix from I&E’s corresponding structure is what the interviewees from B&C 
referred to as ‘virtual organisation’, ‘virtual operations model’, and ‘network organisation’. This 
virtual organisation embraces the B&C organisation, international subsidiaries and area offices as 
well as a partner network. As it can be seen from Figure 8, there is no reporting relationship between 
the business areas and the international subsidiaries and area offices. Instead, the subsidiaries and 
area offices directly report to the CEO. Hence, the relationship between B&C and the area 
organisation is of colleague-to-colleague nature, or as the Segment Director 2 (B&C) put it: ‘in the 
network, the post doesn’t dictate the strength of the voice. Instead, it is very personal, colleague to 
colleague’. The Segment Director 1 (B&C) described the virtual organisation as follows: ‘It’s not a 
very easy organisation model but, on the other hand, if we think about empowerment. When me and 
my friend had a long history in Tekla and we looked at B&C, the organisation is like an anthill. The 
hill grows and everybody works, but if you look at it from outside, you can’t see what the 
management model and structure are in it. You have so many dimensions in the matrix, you’ve got 
countries, you’ve got functions, you’ve got segments. I think it was a good comparison.’ 
 
Figure 8. Tekla Organisation Chart 
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This virtual organisation was perceived as very powerful in directing employee behaviour. The 
interviewees referred to the virtual or network organisation on many occasions irrespective of the 
specific package element under discussion. The following comments highlight the arguably strong 
steering effect of the virtual organisation on employee behaviour: ‘I think it’s strongly this 
networking, we have succeeded in creating such a culture for Tekla. Actually, I believe that if a 
person doesn’t have a personal interest in being part of the network, it’s very complicated to work at 
Tekla’ (SD 2, B&C), ‘then the comment can come through the network, and usually at some point 
the specific group guides the person... perhaps the signals come typically through the network... 
because it’s so varied, you are a part of many groups and networks, and therefore the network itself 
gives you feedback in a way’ (SD 2, B&C), and ‘we talk about a concept of virtual organisation, 
which is the most difficult management model to control. People generally aim for hierarchical 
structures and when we have broken those hierarchical structures by creating this kind of virtual 
organisations, it also means that you don’t have all the resources... It forces you into a certain 
cooperation of this kind’ (EVP,  B&C).  Therefore,  it  seems  that  the  virtual  organisation  is  a  
significant part of the day-to-day actions of B&C’s employees and being part of this network induces 
a certain way of working and communicating and, hence, acts as an effective means of directing 
employee behaviour.    
 
Also, the fact that Tekla and its both business areas have altered their organisation structures 
relatively often implies that the organisation structure is believed to provide an effective means of 
managing business and directing employee behaviour. A good example of this is the new matrix 
organisation of I&E. The Segment Director 1 (I&E) who inherited a responsibility from the old 
organisation structure of I&E explained the effect of the new segment-based organisation as follows: 
‘I still have this consultancy responsibility, but the directive factor is clearly the challenge of the 
matrix organisation. That is, the segment is, however, what conditions the actions’.  
 
In sum, the organisation structure seems to direct employee behaviour in both business units. The 
frequent occurrence of the virtual organisation of B&C during the interviews indicates that the 
steering effect is likely to be stronger in B&C than in I&E. However, the use of organisation 
structure in both units lends support to the notion of Malmi & Brown (2008) that organisational 
design and structure work as control systems through organising individuals and groups in a way that 
 
 
72 
 
both encourages certain types of contact and relationships, and enables employees’ consistent and 
predictable behaviour.  
 
Second, what lies at the heart of the governance structures applied in the business units, are the 
different councils, management teams and meetings taking place on a regular basis. As it is depicted 
in Figures 4 and 5 above, the governance structures forge a strong link with both the planning and 
cybernetic controls. This is clearly attributable to the role of these councils and meetings as a 
reviewer, follower and supervisor of issues such as strategy and its implementation, budgetary 
targets and BSCs. Indeed, the governance structures seem to constitute a part of what the Senior Vice 
President responsible for I&E labelled as ‘management system’, which includes strategy, action 
plans, and the management of operative business (i.e. management teams as well as financial 
forecasting and follow-up). 
 
The governance structures of I&E consist of three management teams. The first one is the actual 
management team of I&E and it includes all segment/unit leaders and a couple of invitees. This team 
assemble for a meeting on a quarterly basis to review revenue, cost and result forecasts as well as the 
business unit’s action plan. In addition, there are two smaller management teams, which meet on a 
monthly basis and involve various experts across the business unit. The customer management team 
concentrates on following that the sales and consultation are in line with the plans, whereas the 
management team for product development focuses on monitoring a product road map and its euro 
targets. 
 
The governance structures of B&C also consist of three management teams. These three are the 
system and process council, the operative sales and marketing council, and the product development 
council. Of important note is that there is not an actual management team of B&C. These councils 
involve many employees across the business unit and, surprisingly, are not chaired by the Executive 
Vice President who is merely a member of these councils. Moreover, due to the global network 
organisation which is mainly responsible for the sales of B&C, there are area specific management 
reviews or area navigations taking place on a quarterly basis. Since the subsidiaries and area offices 
are profit centres, these navigations concentrate on monitoring the profit contributions and on 
reviewing market conditions. The importance of these area navigations is illustrated by the fact that 
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both the CEO and CFO participate in these navigations in order to enable a more rapid and less 
hierarchical decision making. 
 
Since the governance structures are an essential part of the management system in both business 
units, they deal with strategy implementation, budgets and BSCs, they involve a number of 
employees across the business unit, a considerable amount of decision rights are assigned to them, 
and they occur on a recurring basis, it is argued here that these management teams, councils, area 
navigations and other meetings have an important role in directing employee behaviour. 
Consequently, the governance structures of both B&C and I&E can be argued to form an important 
interface between the planning, cybernetic, and the administrative controls within the MCSPs.    
Finally, the role of policies and procedures is argued to be a supportive one as opposed to a strongly 
directive and restrictive one in both business units. Though the interviewees felt that there are 
documented rules, policies and procedures in plenty, none of them perceived them as having a strong 
effect on employees’ day-to-day actions. This interpretation is supported by comments such as ‘That 
shows in a way, that even though we have rules, it is not a strong bureaucrat direction’ (SD 1, 
B&C), ‘Perhaps they are more like general instructions, just like the ones of financial administration 
and finance, but the processes don’t restrict anybody up to a very accurate level’ (VP, HR), and ‘It 
doesn’t start from the idea of creating directions, instead, we develop our operations and document 
when consider it as necessary’ (SVP, I&E). Moreover, according to some interviewees certain 
policies and procedures could be better adhered to, which further highlights the merely supportive 
nature of these controls. 
 
6.3.2 Summary 
 
The research findings concerning the MCSPs are summarised in Table 2. As it can be noted, the 
MCSPs of the business units are considerably akin to each other. Indeed, in respect of planning, 
cybernetic, reward and compensation, and cultural controls, the packages operate in a relatively 
similar fashion within the business units. Hence, the global organisation of B&C along with its 
effects on other controls (e.g. planning and cultural controls) constitutes the most apparent difference 
between B&C and I&E.  
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Table 2. Summary of the MCSP Findings 
 
 
 
Moreover, if the controls are classified according to Chenhall’s (2003) grouping15, the research 
findings indicate that the “organic” forms of MCS seem to play a more dominant role than the 
“mechanistic” forms of MCS in fulfilling the intended functions of the MCSP. This is due to the 
                                                  
15 According to Chenhall (2003), mechanistic controls rely on formal rules, standardized operating procedures and routines, whereas 
organic systems are more flexible, responsive, involve fewer rules and standardized procedures and tend to be richer in data. 
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following controls representing the “organic” forms of MCS: (1) social controls (organisational 
culture and values emphasising empowerment), (2) personnel controls (emphasis on recruitment), (3) 
sophisticated integrative mechanisms (management teams, organisation structures, and area 
navigations emphasising decentralisation), (4) prospect controls (focus on plans and future through 
strategic planning, BSCs and rolling forecasting), and (5) strategic interactive controls (planning in 
general and the BSC in particular). On the other hand, the high budget use (importance and 
involvement) can be argued to represent the only “mechanistic” form of MCS operating within the 
business units (see Chenhall, 2003, p. 133). Hence, it seems that the business units do not heavily 
rely on formal and restrictive control systems and mechanisms in their MCSP configurations. 
 
Figure 9. Interplay between the Control Package Elements 
 
 
 
The observed interplay between the five control elements within the business units is illustrated in 
Figure 9. First, the cultural controls at the bottom represent broad, yet subtle controls that are slow to 
change and, thus, provide a contextual frame for other controls. This is in line with the notion of 
Flamholtz (1983, p. 158–159), who asserts that “culture is... in fact, the starting point for the design 
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of an organizational control system, because it determines (or at least ought to determine) the nature 
of the other components”. Second, planning, cybernetic, and administrative controls in the middle 
are interrelated since planning and cybernetic controls seem to be tightly linked in practice and 
administrative controls are argued to create the structure in which they are exercised. Finally, reward 
and compensation controls remain relatively separate from other package elements since they are 
partly determined by factors beyond strategic and action plans as well as budgetary targets. In sum, 
these findings strongly corroborate the presumptions of Malmi & Brown (2008), except for the fact 
that they assumed reward and compensation controls to be tightly linked with planning and 
cybernetic controls.   
 
6.4 FUNCTIONALITY OF MCSP 
 
Whether the interviewees from the two business units perceived their MCSPs as functional or not 
was measured through a six-item measure provided by Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004). In this study 
this measure is also used beyond its initial purpose of measuring contextual ambidexterity, since it is 
believed to provide essential information on control package’s functionality. Of important note is 
that the results presented below are not based on any statistical analysis due to the low amount of 
respondents. Instead, the analysis is primarily based on the comments by which the interviewees 
elaborated on their answers. The two sections below will elaborate on how the respondents evaluated 
the functionality of their business unit’s MCSP.   
 
6.4.1 Building & Construction Business Area 
 
The results concerning the functionality of B&C’s MCSP are depicted in Table 3. In terms of 
alignment, it seems that the MCS within the package work coherently, they waste resources on 
unproductive activities only to a scant extent, and they are unlikely to give employees conflicting 
objectives. However, the interviewees admitted that ‘the classical area-headquarters conflict comes 
every now and then’ (EVP, B&C). In terms of adaptability, the interviewees strongly felt that the 
MCS encourage people to challenge outmoded traditions, practices and sacred cows, as the following 
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comments indicate: ‘It starts from our people, our people question. In that way it starts from the 
systems that we have such a challenge-permitting atmosphere. It’s in the culture’ (EVP, B&C), ‘it 
[challenge] is strongly in the culture’ (SD 2, B&C), and ‘there’s high empowerment in Tekla and 
you are allowed to question everything and in principle everything is questioned’ (SD 1, B&C). 
 
Table 3. Functionality of MCSP in the Building & Construction Business Unit 
 
 
 
Moreover, the respondents claimed that the MCS are flexible and responsive in the face of rapid 
changes in markets as well as in business priorities. The Executive Vice President responsible for 
B&C illustrated this argument as follows: ‘There are always structures that make it stiff. So we are 
relatively fast versus our competitors... There is a significant matter at which we aim through this 
virtual organisation. Typically our competitors are such organisations that they might have different 
organisations for Europe and USA. That is, it’s very complicated for them to move knowledge and 
capabilities across geographical frontiers. Let’s say that a salesman in a certain situation when he 
meets a customer in Germany, we have a fairly efficient global virtual organisation in a sense that 
we have best practices, how to present things and sell in a specific situation and the support material 
relating to that... we are able to distribute that efficiently and quickly. And it comes from this virtual 
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organisation... We are able to distribute it on a rapid basis versus a more hierarchical and such 
organisation that is divided into compartments abroad.’ 
 
However, a contrary argument was provided by the Segment Director 2 (B&C) who felt that the 
package as a whole works well, but the virtual organisation could be more agile than it currently is. 
Taken together, it seems that the MCSP of B&C is perceived as working well and being internally 
consistent, i.e. the MCS within it have been designed (intentionally or unintentionally) to achieve 
similar ends (Abernethy & Chua, 1996). In addition, it should be noted that the cultural and 
administrative controls were frequently referred to when asked about the functionality of B&C’s 
package of controls, which highlights the important role of these controls within the MCSP. 
 
6.4.2 Infra & Energy Business Area 
 
Table 4 summarises the results regarding the functionality of I&E’s MCSP. In respect of alignment, 
the interviewees representing I&E perceived their MCSP as coherent in supporting the overall 
objectives of the business unit, efficient in employing resources, and consistent in providing 
employees with organisational objectives as the corresponding interviewees representing B&C.   
 
However, the interviewees did not perceive the MCS as encouraging in challenging outmoded 
traditions and practices. However, comments such as: ‘I don’t think whether they are such flexible, 
but in a way the operations model is however flexible if needed’ (SD  2,  I&E)  and  ‘I just keep 
relaying the extent to which it [occurred flexibility] was a management system bound case... It starts 
from the people that now something has to be done and the management system bent to that 
relatively well’ (SVP, I&E) indicate that the respondents may have not considered informal controls 
(such as cultural controls) as MCS. Instead, the comments suggest they might have merely 
considered controls included in the management system described above (i.e. strategy, action plans, 
and the management of operative business (management teams as well as financial forecasting and 
follow-up)). 
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Table 4. Functionality of MCSP in the Infra & Energy Business Unit 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the MCS operating within I&E were claimed to be relatively flexible in the face of 
changes in markets, but only averagely responsive when confronted by changes in business 
priorities. However, comments such as ‘I don’t think these systems evolve very rapidly, when they 
are done once a year, then that’s it’ (SD 2, I&E) and ‘Are they supposed to evolve, or are they 
flexible in a way?... if a management control system includes a capability to react to changes in 
business priorities, then it doesn’t have to change’ (SVP, I&E) indicate, on the one hand, that the 
interviewees’ conception of MCS may have again been restricted to the ones included in the 
management system, and, on the other hand, that the MCS in effect are perceived as responsive in the 
face of shifts in business priorities. Therefore, it is argued here that the MCSP of I&E is also 
perceived as working well and being internally consistent – both in terms of alignment and 
adaptability. 
 
Also, if a view is adopted according to which an MCSP is functionally effective if a business unit is 
successfully executing its strategy, both B&C and I&E can be argued to have a functionally well-
working MCSP. This is due to the success that the growth-oriented B&C has achieved revenue-wise 
in the past nine years, i.e. the revenue has more than tripled (see Figure 2 above). On the other hand, 
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the I&E business area has succeeded in achieving its profitability targets since during its existence in 
2006, 2007 and 2008 the unit has reached operating result percentages of 8.8, 15.4, and 15.2, 
respectively. Hence, there is both subjective and objective evidence supporting the assertion that the 
business units’ MCSPs are robust in terms of functionality.   
 
6.5 TEKLA AND ORGANISATIONAL AMBIDEXTERITY  
 
The results of Tekla’s ambidextrous orientation are illustrated in Table 5. The results show that, in 
general, the interviewees perceived Tekla as an ambidextrous organisation, which engages both in 
exploration and exploitation. Another piece of evidence lending support to this interpretation is the 
fact that Tekla has prospered and survived for over 40 years in a fast-changing business 
environment16. Therefore, during these decades Tekla must have been able to sustain its competitive 
advantage in the face of environmental transitions and to fight against becoming inert as it ages. That 
is to say, Tekla must have been able to engage in sufficient exploitation to ensure its current viability 
and, at the same time, to devote enough energy to exploration to ensure its future viability, i.e. it 
must have been able to execute ambidextrous strategy.   
 
How has Tekla succeeded in this challenging task of pursuing exploitation and exploration 
concurrently? The empirical evidence of this case study indicates that this capability is at least 
partially attributable to the MCSP of the company (substantially akin to the MCSPs of the business 
units). In effect, the MCSP is argued to enable not only structural ambidexterity but also contextual 
ambidexterity. Specifically, the administrative controls operating within the company are argued to 
operate as antecedents of structural ambidexterity whereas the contextual ambidexterity is believed 
to be achieved through an internally consistent MCSP.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
16 For a comprehensive discussion on the high failure rates and deteriorating life expectancy of contemporary firms, see 
O’Reilly & Tushman (2008, p. 186–187).  
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Table 5. Ambidextrous Orientation of Tekla Oyj 
 
 
 
Thus, structural ambidexterity seems to be attributable to administrative controls in general and to 
organisation structure in particular. As it was noted in the foregoing, both B&C and I&E have an 
own product development unit in their matrix organisations. However, the product development of 
I&E solely concentrates on developing existing products whereas in B&C the focus is on developing 
both new and existing products ‘on a “forty-sixty” basis’ (SD 2, B&C). Furthermore, the 
interviewees from I&E clarified that the lower ratings of exploitation-related questions (focus on 
existing customers and products, and cost efficiency) and the higher ratings of the exploration related 
questions (focus on new market segments, customers and products, and innovativeness) when the 
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company-wide  orientation  is  considered,  are  due  to  B&C’s  influence,  which  suggests  that,  as  a  
general conception, B&C engages more in exploration whereas I&E is merely an exploitation 
oriented business unit. Also, the segment-based organisation can be argued to promote ambidexterity 
through assigning specific segments to “explore” new customers, markets and products, while certain 
segments continue to “exploit” existing customers, markets and products.  
 
The Executive Vice President responsible for B&C explained the rationale behind this idea as 
follows: ‘When we have expanded our clientele, we search all the time for new type of customers and 
we needed persons responsible for customers to build new business for Tekla, because otherwise the 
euros disappear. One sells by ten million and the other by hundred thousand but the idea is that the 
customer segment of hundred thousand sells some day by ten million. In order for it to get its own 
attention and leader, who is only held responsible for the hundred thousand and not for the ten 
million, then the attention in building that customer segment’s business is entirely focused on that... 
This is the way to get the new business take-offs. They need to be measured and they need to be held 
accountable completely separately, and consider separately. Otherwise they won’t develop.’ 
 
Therefore, since the explorative capabilities are primarily located in B&C and the exploitative 
capabilities in I&E but also in B&C, the structural ambidexterity of the case company seems to be a 
combination of spatial separation (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004) and parallel structures (Adler et al, 
1999). However, as it has been argued, the structural separation alone is not sufficient in an attempt 
to attain organisational ambidexterity (Smith & Tushman, 2005; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). 
Indeed, it is argued here that contextual ambidexterity is needed to complement the structural means 
of achieving ambidexterity. 
 
According to Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004), a context characterised by a combination of “stretch”, 
“discipline”, “support”, and “trust” facilitates contextual ambidexterity. The ways in which the five 
different MCSP elements contribute to the creation of such effective organisation context are 
discussed below. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, the strong and widely shared organisation 
culture of Tekla promoting empowerment and allowing employees to question everything is believed 
to contribute to the attainment of contextual ambidexterity (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Moreover, 
the culture along with common values and vision statements and elements are argued to contribute to 
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the establishment of “stretch” (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Also, recruitment, which according to 
Malmi & Brown (2008) classifies as a cultural control, was perceived as crucial in promoting 
ambidexterity in general and exploration in particular. The Segment Director 2 (B&C) explained this 
as follows: ‘not every individual acts so creatively and splendidly, but others have more enthusiasm 
for thinking things forward and the others have more an ability to do things as agreed upon... the 
recruitment is perhaps the most essential phase in that how to recruit such people to work who are 
capable...’.  
 
Second, Tekla’s organisation (especially B&C’s virtual organisation) and governance structures 
emphasising decentralisation, cooperation, and efficient information sharing are also argued to 
further foster organisational ambidexterity (Jansen et al, 2005). These controls increasing knowledge 
what has happened in other parts of the business, and promoting cooperation and sharing of best 
practices through a number of forums and councils are also argued to contribute to the establishment 
of “support”. Third, the participative and dialogue-like planning process, encompassing both 
strategic planning and action planning (BSC), can be thought to contribute to the establishment of a 
context promoting “trust” (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Fourth, cybernetic controls, and in 
particular, budgeting was perceived to bring cost efficiency and to promote the business units along 
with their international subsidiaries and area offices to strive to meet the profit contribution targets. 
Therefore, the budgeting, or rolling forecasting, is likely to contribute to the establishment of 
“discipline” (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). 
 
Finally, the ambidexterity literature argues that there needs to be a common incentive system for the 
senior team in place that is anchored on the company-wide metrics, not on the success of a separate 
unit (Jansen, 2008a; O’Reilly &Tushman, 2004, 2008). Though Tekla’s incentive system is anchored 
on the overall company performance at the highest level, the further allocation of the bonus pool is 
based on unit-specific performance. Therefore, the influence of reward and compensation controls on 
the attainment of organisational ambidexterity at Tekla can at least be questioned. 
 
Taken together, it seems that a package of controls may play a key role in fostering organisational 
ambidexterity. It was argued that administrative controls are likely to act as an antecedent of 
structural ambidexterity, while cybernetic, cultural, administrative, and planning controls contribute 
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to the establishment of “discipline”, “stretch”, “support”, and “trust”, respectively. Hence, these 
controls are argued to collectively contribute to the establishment of an effective organisation context 
that allows contextual ambidexterity to flourish. 
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7. DISCUSSION 
 
This section discusses a number of findings emerging from the study. First, the MCSP findings will 
be discussed in the light of contingency theory. Second, the section discusses the described roles and 
uses of different control package elements and links these various controls to the levers of control 
framework provided by Simons (1990, 1991, 1995, 2000). Finally, the role of an MCSP and its 
elements in fostering organisational ambidexterity will be discussed. 
 
It was argued above that both B&C and I&E have a functionally well-working MCSP despite the 
distinct circumstances in which they operate and the parallel of their control packages. According to 
the contingency theory, however, the effectiveness of an MCSP hinges on the level of fit or 
alignment between the contingent variables and the MCSP (Drury, 2004). Of important note is that it 
seems relevant to study the impact of contingency variables on the configuration of business units’ 
MCSP within a single firm – especially if the business units are highly independent of each other 
(see e.g. Govindarajan, 1984; Otley 1978). Another view is to assume that the contingency factors 
influence at a firm level irrespective of the similarities and differences between business units within 
that firm. 
 
Given the above reasoning, an important question arises: if two virtually similar MCSPs can be 
equally effective in the face of different contingencies, can two different MCSPs be equally effective 
in the face of similar contingencies? That is to say, are there MCSP configurations that are 
equifinal17? Although there are very few MCS studies that have addressed equifinality (Bedford, 
2006), the idea that control systems can act as substitutes has been suggested by a number of scholars 
(Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Dent, 1990; Fisher, 1995; Huikku, 2007). Moreover, a few studies have 
suggested that an informal control practice could replace, at least partially, a formal control practice 
(Huikku, 2007), and that an equal control of activities could be achieved by different formal control 
systems (Gerdin, 2005). Sandelin’s (2008) case study is the first one to examine whether various 
configurations of control systems (i.e. MCS packages) can provide an equal final state. The results of 
                                                  
17 Whilst the contingency theory rests upon the assumption that there is a deterministic relationship between context and organisational 
design, equifinality undermines this assumption and, conversely, suggests that an equally good final state can be achieved through 
several different organisational structures even in the face of similar contingencies (Gresov & Drazin, 1997). 
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his study lend support to Huikku’s (2007) findings in that they indicate that a relatively simple and 
less accounting-centric control package can be functionally equivalent with more formal and 
accounting-centric packages if the internal consistency18 holds. 
 
Why are the control packages then so similar? One explanation could be the point made by the Vice 
President (HR) who stated: ‘if the other business unit develops balanced scorecard forward, then 
another unit takes it in use afterwards. And if a good procedure is created somewhere, they are 
aware of this and they follow... These best practices are copied from a unit to another’. Another 
explanation may be the abovementioned idea that the contingency factors are primarily confronted 
by a firm, rather than the business units operating within that firm. 
 
An interesting finding of the study is the manner in which the BSC is used in both business units, i.e. 
merely as an overarching planning device. Although the BSC seems to work relatively well in its 
intended use and can, therefore, be argued to have achieved a level of “success” (see Andon et al, 
2009), it might well be that the BSC is still evolving in both B&C and I&E. Indeed, according to 
Bukh & Malmi (2005), very few firms are able to succeed with their first attempt to develop a BSC. 
Usually, they argue, the experiences gained from developing the first BSC lead to major changes in 
both the structure of the BSC and the management process around. This view was supported by the 
Segment Director 1 (B&C) who commented on the specificity of BSC as follows: ‘We have a really 
young organisation here... we have grown to this during the past one and a half years, whereupon it 
has an effect on the fact that... Every year you are able to improve, at once besides everything else it 
is difficult to take through an accurate [BSC]. I have tried that when we first made it [BSC] at a 
general level, now we took it to a slightly more specific level, but so that next year we would be able 
to take it to a bit more specific level.’ 
 
Another interesting finding is the key role that administrative controls in general and organisation 
structure in particular, play in the direction of employee behaviour in the business units. In effect, the 
virtual organisation of B&C was argued to “force” employees into a certain way of working, 
                                                  
18 An MCSP is considered to be internally consistent when the different control systems of the package are designed to achieve similar 
ends (Abernethy & Chua, 1996) Sandelin (2008, p. 338), based on the previous notion by Abernethy & Chua (1996), furthers the 
argument by stating that “each control element contributes independently and directly to goal attainment; internal consistency echoes 
independent yet goal-consistent design of control elements”. 
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contacting and building relationships. This finding is particularly important since prior research has 
considered organisation design and structure merely as a contextual variable, rather than as a MCS 
that senior management can use as a means of directing employee behaviour within an organisation 
(Malmi & Brown, 2008). Furthermore, it was also argued that cultural controls play a dominant role 
in the business units’ MCSPs. Indeed, the interviewees emphasised Tekla’s widely shared 
organisational culture which promotes high empowerment and an atmosphere that allows everything 
to be questioned. However, irrespective of the engineering-oriented personnel and organisation, the 
presence of this culture seemed not to weaken the role of strategies and to strengthen the role of 
diagnostic measurement (Kasurinen, 2002).   
 
Conversely, it was argued that not only the senior management but also employees at lower 
organisational levels placed considerably effort on strategy work in both B&C and I&E. In addition, 
the budgeting (or rolling forecasting) was perceived as important but however, it was not argued to 
play more than a neutral role in both MCSPs. Hence, it seems that the MCSPs of B&C and I&E are 
characterised more by “organic” or informal controls, as opposed to “mechanistic” or formal 
controls. This lends support to the findings of Marginson (1999) who found the control situation of a 
major British organisation to be of informal nature. The final comment made by the Executive Vice 
President responsible for B&C succinctly highlights this important role of informal controls in the 
case company: ‘People are divided into certain main categories according to their social style. 
Other people want, they are more like “planners”, they want a more strict remit whereas others are 
more in that “not so strict limits and more autonomy”. Our employees are emphasised in this “not 
so strict limits and more autonomy” category, when the majority is in that crib. And thus it means 
that then there’s less such steering that is strict. Such a group doesn’t need them that much. Then the 
group which according to their social style belongs to the category expecting more precise areas of 
responsibility and so, they suffer a bit from it, because majority of the organisation don’t even 
perceive them as necessary.’   
 
How can the package configurations be understood in the light of Simons’ levers of control 
framework (beliefs, boundary, diagnostic and interactive systems)? First, cultural controls, i.e. the 
widely shared organisational culture along with the deeply instilled values influencing all aspects of 
organisational activity, seem to align well with Simons’ beliefs systems. Second, since managers pay 
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frequent and regular attention to the participative and dialogue type planning process and, hence, are 
personally involved in it, the planning controls (strategic planning and BSC) can be argued to work 
as an interactive control system within the business units. Moreover, as budgeting (or rolling 
forecasting) and the incentive systems of Tekla allow managers to monitor and reward the 
achievement of pre-established goals, it is argued here that both cybernetic controls and reward and 
compensation controls act as a diagnostic control system. Finally, the administrative controls were 
argued to encourage certain types of work, contact and relationships, and to enable employees’ 
consistent and predictable behaviour. Therefore, in Simons’ terms, they can be considered as 
boundary systems. This illustration indicates that the business units have an internally consistent 
MCSP where MCS seem to complement each other in an attempt to achieve similar ends. However, 
the above depiction does not lend support to the notion of Simons (1995), according to which 
strategic planning can never be an interactive control system. 
 
The final point deserving further discussion is the finding that an internally consistent MCSP can be 
of assistance in fostering organisational ambidexterity. Specifically, it is depicted in the foregoing 
how a set of MCS may collectively define a context that allows exploitation and exploration to 
concurrently flourish. However, it can also be discussed which elements of the control package seem 
to contribute to the attainment of exploitation and which ones are more likely to promote exploration. 
This discussion does not apply to structural ambidexterity, since the contribution of administrative 
controls, and especially organisation structure, seems fundamental. In terms of contextual 
ambidexterity, however, the empirical evidence suggests that cybernetic controls (budgeting or 
rolling forecasting) are likely to support exploitation whereas cultural and planning controls seem to 
encourage exploration. Administrative controls, on the other hand, can be thought to foster both 
exploitation and exploration.  
 
In particular, this is due to (1) the role of budgeting in promoting efficiency, control, certainty, and 
variance reduction, (2) the role of organisation culture and values in encouraging search, discovery, 
and innovation, (3) strategic planning and the BSC providing ‘room for innovation’ (Senior Vice 
President, I&E), and (4) the role of administrative controls in encouraging certain types of work, 
contact and relationships (i.e. control and certainty) as well as in supporting autonomy. Also, it is 
worth noting that the idea of accounting-centric MCS encouraging employees to innovate and 
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challenge outdated traditions and practices (i.e. to engage in exploration) was perceived as odd. 
When asked what would be the device through which such behaviour could be encouraged, most of 
the respondents referred to employees and recruitment. This is in line with the notion of Merchant & 
Van der Stede (2003), according to whom the selection and placement can sometimes be regarded as 
the single most important elements of an MCS (here MCSP). In sum, in light of the evidence of this 
case study, it seems that accounting-centric and more formal MCS are likely to foster exploitation 
whereas more informal and “organic” controls seem to contribute to the attainment of exploration. 
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8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
8.1 SUMMARY 
 
This empirical case study sought to examine the operation of management control systems as a 
package and the performance implications of MCSPs at the strategic business unit level in a Finnish 
listed company – Tekla Oyj. Drawing on the typology presented by Malmi & Brown (2008), the 
study endeavoured to uncover what kind of MCSP configurations exist at the SBU level and to 
compare and contrast how these control packages and their functionality stand vis-à-vis each other. 
In addition, this thesis examined whether control packages of certain kind, if any, enable a firm to 
jointly pursue both exploitative and explorative orientation, i.e. to execute ambidextrous strategy. By 
analysing eight interviews conducted at the senior and middle management level this thesis 
contributes to a larger research project on management control systems and their operation as a 
package. 
 
Several research findings emerge from the study. First, the MCSPs of two distinct business units 
were found to be considerably akin to each other and equally functional in the face of different 
contingencies. Specifically, the MCSPs of the business units were characterised by (1) a participative 
and coherent planning process, (2) BSCs used “in a tableau de bord fashion”, (3) a company-wide 
budgeting (or rolling forecasting) process acting as a primary cybernetic control system, (4) a 
partially separate incentive system from other controls, (5) organisation and governance structures 
emphasising decentralisation and empowerment, and (6) an overarching and deeply instilled 
organisation culture. The global virtual organisation of B&C was argued to constitute the main 
difference between the business units. As a general conception, the packages were argued to lay 
emphasis on “organic” and informal controls as opposed to “mechanistic” and formal controls.     
 
In respect of the interplay between the control package elements, the cultural controls at the bottom 
were argued to represent broad, yet subtle controls that are slow to change and, thus, to provide a 
contextual frame for other controls. Planning, cybernetic, and administrative controls in the middle, 
on the other hand, were believed to be interrelated since planning and cybernetic controls appeared to 
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be tightly linked in practice and administrative controls were found to create the structure in which 
they are exercised on a recurring basis. Finally, reward and compensation controls were asserted to 
remain relatively separate from other package elements due to their partial determination by factors 
beyond strategic and action plans as well as budgetary targets. 
 
Notwithstanding the considerably different contingency factors faced by the business units, the fairly 
akin MCSPs of B&C and I&E were found to be equally functional on the basis of subjective and 
objective measures. This questions the basic idea of contingency theory that the effectiveness of an 
MCSP hinges on the level of fit or alignment between the contingent variables and the MCSP. 
Therefore, it was argued that the contingency factors might rather have an influence on company 
level MCS than on MCS at the business unit level. This finding also raises a question about potential 
equifinality of the control packages. That is to say, if two fundamentally similar MCSPs can result in 
an equally good final state even in the face of different contingencies, can two different MCSPs be 
equally functional or effective in the face of similar contingencies, i.e. can the package 
configurations be equifinal. 
 
In respect of organisational ambidexterity, it was argued that an internally consistent package of 
controls together with a sound selection and use of control package elements may play a key role in 
fostering organisational ambidexterity. It was argued that administrative controls are likely to act as 
an antecedent of structural ambidexterity, while cybernetic, cultural, administrative, and planning 
controls contribute to the establishment of “discipline”, “stretch”, “support”, and “trust”, 
respectively. In other words, these controls were argued to collectively contribute to the 
establishment of an effective organisation context that allows contextual ambidexterity to occur. 
Finally, even though particular attention was paid to how an MCSP as a whole contributes to the 
attainment of organisational ambidexterity the findings suggest that accounting-centric and more 
formal MCS are likely to foster exploitation whereas more informal and “organic” controls seem to 
foster exploration. 
 
In sum, it seems that an effective organisational control can be attained by means of “organic” and 
informal controls without relying heavily on accounting-centric controls. In effect, it can also be 
argued that it could be in the best interest of the senior management to lay stress on informal controls 
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as part of their company’s MCSP. Indeed, emphasising informal controls would not only provide an 
attracting way to direct employee behaviour but also potentially assist an organisation in attaining 
explorative capabilities which in conjunction with exploitative capabilities allow organisational 
ambidexterity to flourish.    
  
8.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This study is subject to a number of limitations. First, even though the typology of Malmi & Brown 
(2008) was argued to provide us with an umbrella under which MCS packages can be studied in a 
more comprehensive fashion, it also provides us with a somewhat predetermined framework for 
MCSP. That is, since the definition of MCS used in this study asserts that management controls 
include all the devices and systems managers use to ensure that the behaviours and decisions of their 
employees are consistent with the organisation’s objectives and strategies, there is a possibility that, 
in effect, all MCS having an effect on employee behaviour are not necessarily captured by the 
framework of Malmi & Brown (2008). It should be remembered, however, that this typology builds 
upon a wide array of MCS research and is, therefore, likely to encompass the most relevant and 
common MCS operating within organisations. 
 
Second, a caveat of the study is that the analysis is primarily based on the subjective assertions of 
interviewees. For instance, it has been posited that when asked about the connections the 
organisation has made between its strategic intent and the means by which it hopes to realise them, 
senior managers may have a need to elaborate their strategies more precisely in order to maintain a 
good fit between objectives, plans and performance measures (Otley, 1999). In addition, the control 
package (and especially administrative controls in it) of I&E was fairly new to the interviewees 
which may have had an effect on the picture and opinion that they have about these controls and their 
functionality. However, this study sought to avoid this caveat, as far as possible, by using various 
sources of evidence to provide multiple measures of the same issue (triangulation). 
 
Third, this study is based on a single case from which it is difficult to make generalisation to wider 
population. Also, care is needed when interpreting the results since the packages and the linkages 
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between the controls are not necessarily optimal. However, the research findings of this study 
encourage further examination of management control systems packages, the configurations they 
take in practice, the interplay between various control mechanisms as well as the antecedents of 
organisational ambidexterity. Indeed, future research should not only exert more effort to examine 
the configurations that management control systems packages take in practice in various contexts but 
also to further uncover how various control package elements interrelate with each other.  
 
For example, are there trade-offs between control package elements? Do administrative controls play 
a key role in other control packages and if yes, in which industries? What are the manners in which a 
BSC is used as part of an MCSP – e.g. in a “management by objectives” fashion, as an “information 
system” or perhaps in a way that resembles the French tableau de bord? What is the role of reward 
and compensation controls in relation to other control elements and in steering employee behaviour 
within an organisation? Can an informal and “organic” control package be equally functional with a 
package relying primarily on formal and “mechanistic” controls? Do cultural controls really form a 
contextual frame for other controls and are planning, cybernetic and administrative controls tightly 
interrelated in practice? Furthermore, both configurations and linkages between the control package 
elements should be addressed against the functionality and/or performance they produce. For 
example, is an internally consistent control package a prerequisite for organisational ambidexterity? 
What are the configurations through which it could be attained and in which settings? Do we need all 
elements of an MCSP to establish an effective context for organisational ambidexterity to occur?  
 
These questions are likely to provide fruitful avenues for future research but addressing them is by 
no means easy since the operation of management control systems as a package and organisational 
ambidexterity are arguably multifaceted phenomena. Therefore, larger research teams and research 
programs, such as the one to which this study is a subordinate, are presumably necessary when 
studying these issues. In respect of research methods, longitudinal case studies and large-sample 
empirical studies are believed to provide the most appropriate approaches forward. However, the 
interviews conducted for this thesis lend support to the notion of Malmi & Brown (2008) that 
interviews are likely to provide an appropriate means to collect large datasets, rather than 
questionnaire surveys. This is due mainly to the need to ascertain that the interviewees have 
understood the concepts and issues of interest whereby the findings are likely to stem from rigorous 
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scientific research. The above questions and points are of considerable relevance, since 
understanding the configurations and interplay between the MCSP elements and the association of 
MCSP with organisational ambidexterity is not only likely to fill a major gap in the extant body of 
literature but also to help practitioners in coping with the inevitable challenge of firm prosperity. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS PACKAGE 
 
Cultural Controls 
Clans Values  Symbols 
Planning Cybernetic Controls 
Reward and 
Compensation Long 
range 
planning 
Action 
planning Budgets 
Financial 
Measurement 
Systems 
Non Financial 
Measurement 
Systems 
Hybrid 
Measurement 
Systems 
Administrative Controls 
Governance Structure Organisation Structure Policies and Procedures 
 
Source: Malmi & Brown (2008) 
 
APPENDIX B: SIMONS’ LEVERS OF CONTROL FRAMEWORK 
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APPENDIX C: DESCRIPTION OF MCSP ELEMENTS 
 
Elements Description Components 
Planning Ex-ante form of control (Flamholtz et al., 
1985); first it sets out the goals of the 
functional areas of the organisation 
thereby directing effort and behaviour; 
second, it provides the standards to be 
achieved in relation to the goal, making 
clear the level of effort and behaviour 
expected; third, it enables congruence by 
aligning goals across the functional areas 
of an organisation, thereby controlling the 
activities of groups and individuals. 
Action planning – goals and 
actions for the immediate 
future, usually a twelve-month 
period, are established; has a 
tactical focus. 
Long-range planning - the 
goals and actions for the 
medium and long run are 
established; has a more 
strategic focus. 
Cybernetic There are five characteristics of cybernetic 
control (Green & Welsh, 1988). First, 
there are measures that enable 
quantification of an underlying 
phenomenon, activity or system. Second, 
there are standards of performance or 
targets to be met. Third, there is a 
feedback process that enables comparison 
of the outcome of the activities with the 
standard. This variance analysis arising 
from the feedback is the fourth aspect of 
cybernetic control systems. Fifth is the 
ability to modify the system’s behaviour 
or underlying activities.  
Budgets (Bunce, Fraser & 
Woodcock, 1995; Hansen, 
Otley & Van der Stede, 2003) 
Financial measures (Ittner & 
Larcker, 1998) 
Non-financial measures (Ittner 
& Larcker, 1998) 
Hybrids that contain both 
financial and non-financial 
measures such as the Balanced 
Scorecard (BSC) (Greenwood, 
1981; Kondrasuk, 1981; Ittner 
& Larcker, 1998; Kaplan & 
Norton, 1992, 1996 a b, 2001 
a b; Malina & Selto, 2001) 
Reward/compensation Motivating and increasing the 
performance of individuals and groups 
through attaching rewards to control effort 
direction, effort duration, and effort 
intensity. 
Attaching rewards and or 
compensation to achievement 
of goals (Flamholtz et al., 
1985; Bonner & Sprinkle, 
2002) 
Administrative Administrative control systems are those 
that direct employee behaviour through 
the organizing of individuals (organisation 
design and structure), the monitoring of 
behaviour and who employees are made 
accountable to for their behaviour 
(governance); and through the process of 
specifying how tasks or behaviours are to 
be performed or not performed (policies 
and procedures), (Simons, 1987). 
Organisational design and 
structure (Otley & Berry, 
1980; Emmanuel, Otley & 
Merchant, 1990; Abernethy & 
Chua, 1996; Alvesson & 
Karreman, 2004) 
Governance structures within 
the firm (Abernethy & Chua, 
1996) 
Procedures and policies 
(Macintosh & Daft, 1987; 
Simons, 1987) 
Culture The values, beliefs and social norms 
which are established influence employees 
behaviour. (Birnberg & Snodgrass, 1988; 
Dent, 1991; Pratt & Beaulieu, 1992). 
Value-based controls (Simons, 
1995) 
Clan controls (Ouchi, 1979) 
Symbols (Schein, 1997) 
 
Source: Malmi & Brown (2008) 
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APPENDIX D: A SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E: CONTEXTUAL AMBIDEXTERITY CONSTRUCT 
 
 
 
Source: Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) 
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APPENDIX F: AMBIDEXTROUS ORIENTATION CONSTRUCT 
 
 
 
Source: Lubatkin et al (2006) 
 
 
